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Bankruptcy law exists, in large part, to secure fairness in the distribution of an insolvent debtor's assets among its creditors.' To prevent
the debtor from undermining this goal by transferring its property to a
creditor on the eve of bankruptcy, Congress has long provided the bankruptcy trustee with the power to avoid preferential transfers.2 The focus
of preference law, however, hs not been consistent. Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) in 1978,3 the trustee could
avoid a preferential transfer only if the creditor had reasonable cause to
believe the debtor was insolvent.4 This suggests that preference law was
limited by another objective-that of deterring creditors from scrambling
for an advantage as the debtor approached bankruptcy--and was aimed
only at preferential transfers received by a creditor who had reason to
engage in such untoward behavior. The Code, however, shifted the aim
of the preference provision to transfers that impaired the equality of the
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North Carolina Law Center Foundation. I wish to thank Caroline Nicholson Bruckel, Larry G.
Franceski, S. Elizabeth Gibson, and, especially, Adam H. Broome for their suggestions and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also wish to acknowledge the excellent research
assistance of Elizabeth 3. Armstrong and Patricia Lewandowski.
1. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADIN. NEws 5963, 6138; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5798.
2. See generally Countryman, The Concept ofa Voidable Preferencein Bankruptcy, 38 VAND.
L. REv. 713, 718-50 (1985) (tracing evolution of American concept of preferential transfers).

3. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 took effect on October 1, 1979. 1d. § 402(a), 92 Stat. at 2682.
4. Bankruptcy Act § 60b, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1976). The Bankruptcy Act was thoroughly
revised by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, which enacted
the new Bankruptcy Code. Throughout this article, citations to the provisions of the former Bank-

ruptcy Act will be given without corresponding references to the new provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code.
5. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy distribution without regard to the creditor's state of mind. 6
Section 547(b) of the Code provides that the trustee may avoid any transfer made within the ninety-day period before bankruptcy by an insolvent
debtor to a creditor on account of an antecedent debt that has the effect
of preferring the creditor over other creditors, unless the transfer comes
within one of the exceptions provided in section 547(c). 7 Although a
preference provision aimed only at preventing inequality may incidentally deter the scramble for -advantage, the Code reflects the judgment
that the deterrence objective should not limit the scope of the trustee's
avoiding power.
The extent of the trustee's avoiding power under section 547(b), of
course, depends on the scope of the exceptions; the section 547(c) 8 exceptions were rather narrowly drawn. Prior to 1984, section 547(c)(2), the
so-called ordinary course of business exception, provided that a creditor
could retain a preferential transfer in payment of a debt (thus excluding a
transfer to secure debt) incurred within forty-five days of the payment,
provided the debt was incurred and the payment was made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transfer
was made according to ordinary business terms. 9 As originally enacted,
the exception extended only to preferential transfers in payment of a debt
incurred a short time before the transfer, such as monthly payments of
debts for wages, utility services, or inventory and supplies purchased on
short-term credit. Although allowing the creditor to retain such a preferential transfer necessarily precluded a complete realization of the goal of
equality, Congress thought it important "to leave undisturbed normal
financial relations." 10
In 1984, as part of legislation directed primarily at resolving the jurisdictional crisis of the bankruptcy courts," Congress amended the sec6. Even after the enactment of the Code, a transfer to an insider ofthe debtor was preferential
if the inside creditor had, at time it received the transfer, reasonable cause to believe the debtor was
insolvent. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1982). Congress amended section 547(b)(4)(B) in 1984, eliminating the requirement that the creditor have reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at
the time of the transfer. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pnb. L. No.
98-353, § 462(b), 98 Stat. 333, 378.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. MI 1985).

8. 1d § 547(c).
9. Id. § 547(c)(2) (1982).

10. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6329; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE

CONG. & ADMi. NEws 5787, 5874.
11. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat.
333. The 1984 amendments in large part were a response to the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In that case the Supreme
Court held that the jurisdictional grant in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 could not be sustained; bankruptcy judges exercised the essential attributes of Article III judicial power yet did not
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12
tion 547(c)(2) exception to remove the forty-five day limitation.
Although the amendment appears to be minor, it has potentially signifi-

cant implications for preference law. Most commentators have interpreted this amendment as protecting preferential transfers in payment of
long-term debt, emphasizing that the specific forty-five day limitation
was the only obstacle to the extension of section 547(c)(2) to payments
13
on long-term debt incurred and paid in the ordinary course of business.
enjoy life tenure. Id. at 84-87. The 1984 amendments reconstituted the bankruptcy courts as units
of the federal district courts and limited the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 333, 336-41.
12. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 462(c), 98 Stat. 333, 378.
13. See D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATIIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 317-

18 (1985) (45-day requirement removed in response to concern that section 547(c)(2) should protect

"timely principal payments on installment loans"); B. CLARx, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSAcTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 6.4[2][a], at S6-16 (Supp. 1986) ("This amendment should be of.major assistance to Article 9 creditors who receive ordinary course payments on

current debt shortly before bankruptcy."); 4 COLLIER ON BANiRUPTCY 547.38, at 547-125 (15th
ed. 1985) ("As long as a debt is incuned in the ordinary course of the business of the debtor and
transferee, payment of that debt will not effect a preference."); R. JORDAN & W. WARRIEN, BANKRUFrCY 321 (1985) (noting that 1984 amendment eliminates difficult issue of whether installment
payments on bank debt are protected from avoidance by section 547(c)(2)); R. LORD & C. LEWIS,
NORTH CAROLINA SECURITY INTERiSS 220 (1985) ("[B]oth the interest and principal payments
[on bank debt], so long as they are made in ordinary course and on ordinary terms, should fall within
[section 547(c)(2)] under the 1984 amendments

...-");J. WHIT,

TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR BANK-

RUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 45-46 (1985) (suggesting that section 547(c)(2), as amended,
should protect payments by the debtor on installment loans); DeSimone, Section 547(c)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code: The OrdinaryCourse ofBusiness Exception Without the 45 Day Rule, 20 AKRON
L. RBv. 95, 129 (1986) (noting that legislative history of 1984 amendment to section 547(c)(2) does
not expressly limit application of section 547(c)(2) to short-term debt, and arguing that to apply it to
payments on all debt is more consistent with the policies behind the section); Gorney, Eliminationof
the 45-DayRule: Amendment ofSection 547(c)(2) Requires a New Look at Preferences, 91 COM. LJ.
364, 368 (1986) ("Installment debts of both consumer and business debtors paid when due will not
be avoidable because 'the date the debt was incurred' has been eliminated as a measure of the

avoidability."); Herbert, The Trustee Versus the Trade Creditor.U. The 1984Amendment to Section
547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 2 BAWCL DEV. J. 201, 213 (1985) ("[P]ayments on long-term
debt, such as payments on an unsecured promissory note... are now protected if they fall within the
remaining three requirements of Section 547(c)(2)."); Morris, Substantive ConsumerBankruptcy Reform in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act of 1984, 27 WM. & MARY L. RBV. 91, 122-23 (1985)
(arguing that the 1984 amendment expands protection of section 547(c)(2) to "virtually all timely
payments of installment obligations," even where debtor incurred original debt long ago); Weintraub
& Resnick, PreferentialPayment of Long-Term Debts in the OrdinaryCourse ofBusiness-The Effect ofthe 1984 Amendments, 17 U.C.C. L.J. 263, 264 (1985) (The effect of this 1984 amendment is
that the ordinary course ofbusiness exception to the preference rule now applies to long-term as well
as short-term debt.").
Only a few observers have objected to extending the protection of section 547(c)(2) to payments
on long-term debt. Professor Duncan argues that the ordinary course of business requirements
should be interpreted strictly to exclude "atypical" financings, such as long-term financings, but
ofrers no further guidance on how to distinguish "typical" from "atypical" financings. Duncan,
Loan Payments to Secured Creditorsas Preferences Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendment4 64
NEB. L. RBV. 83, 90 (1985). Professor Countryman, on the other hand, does not argue for a limiting
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This interpretation is only superficially attractive. Other commentators,

offering a more careful analysis, have argued that the amendment should
be read as protecting payments on long-term debt because the scant legislative history surrounding the 1984 amendment does not directly indicate
an intent to limit the scope of the section, and that protection of payments on long-term debt is consistent with the policy of protecting "normal financial relations."' 14
Notwithstanding the commentary, in Aguillardv. Bank of Lafayette
(In re Bourgeois),15 the first bankruptcy court to address this issue 16 held
that amended section 547(c)(2) does not extend to payments on longterm debt. The court reasoned that Congress merely intended to remove
the arbitrary forty-five day limitation without significantly expanding the
scope of the exception. The court also stated that long-term debt is not
incurred in the ordinary course of business and that the policy of protecting "normal financial relations" did not justify extending protection to
payments on long-term debt. 17
Although the issue addressed by the commentators and faced by the
court in Bourgeois appears narrow, its resolution will significantly affect
the goals of preference law. If Congress's elimination of the forty-five
day requirement was meant to extend protection to payments on longterm debt, the 1984 amendment will reflect yet another shift in the goal
of preference law-from that of preserving equality of distribution of the
debtor's assets among its creditors to that of avoiding preferential transfers received by creditors under unusual circumstances. If Congress did
not intend this radical shift, then what are the outer limits of amended
section 547(c)(2)?
interpretation of the amended exception, but advocates its repeal because it "creates a gaping hole in
the preference policy by protecting every creditor who receives a payment otherwise avoidable under

section 547(b)." Countryman, supra note 2, at 772. A student commentator has also suggested that
"Congress did not intend to protect all transfers including long-term installment payments" by eliminating the 45-day provision. Note, Timing of Payments by Check Under Section 547 of the Bankrupicy Code 7 CARDozo L. REv. 887, 904 (1986). The author suggests that section 547(c)(2) "was
designed to protect only those payments made in full satisfaction ofa debt in the ordinary course of
business." Id. at 907 n.104. See also Dunham & Price, The End of Preference riabilityfor Unsecured Creditor New Section 547(c)(2) ofthe Bankruptcy Code 60 IND. L.L 487, 490, 499, 505-11
(1985) (asserting that "timely payments made on an unsecured note are now within the [ordinary

course of businessl defense," but presenting some arguments for limited interpretation of section
547(c)(2)).
14. DeSimone, supra note 13, at 128-31.

15. 58 Bankr. 657 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986).
16. Few cases have arisen under the amended section since it is effective only for those cases
filed after October 8, 1984. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcy

547.03[6], at 547-30 (15th ed. 1985).

17. Bourgeois, 58 Bankr. at 659 (citing H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 308, 373, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIm. NEws 5963, 6329).
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This article concludes that section 547(c)(2), as originally enacted
and as amended in 1984, should not be interpreted as protecting preferential payments on long-term debt. Part I briefly sets forth the elements
of a preferential transfer of the debtor's property and the requirements of
section 547(c)(2).18 Part H presents an extensive examination of the statutory development and legislative history of the preference provision and
the section 547(c)(2) exception in an effort to determine Congress's intent
regarding the scope of the exception.19 Part I examines the policies
underlying the preference provision and the exception, and concludes
that the exception should be limited to payments on short-term debt.20
I.

THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

The bankruptcy trustee' 1 has several avoiding powers that enable
him to invalidate certain of the debtor's transactions 22 and recover the

affected property for the debtor's estate.2 3 One of the trustee's most important avoiding powers is the power to avoid preferential transfers24
pursuant to section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.2 5 Under section

547(b), a transfer2 6 of an interest of the debtor in property is a preferential transfer if it is made (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor in payment
of a debt or as security for a debt, (2) on account of an antecedent debt,27
18. See infra notes 21-53 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 54-167 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 168-208 and accompanying text.
21. In a Chapter 11 proceeding, the debtor in possession may exercise the avoiding powers
granted to the trustee in a Chapter 7 proceeding. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (Supp. II 1985). Unless
otherwise indicated, reference to the trustee in this article also includes the debtor in possession if the
proceeding is a Chapter 11 proceeding.
22. Eg., 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (power to avoid transaction voidable by lien
creditor at time of filing of bankruptcy petition); id. § 545 (power to avoid certain statutory liens);
Id. § 548 (power to avoid fraudulent conveyances).
23. If avoidance of the transfer is successfl, "the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the
estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from-() the
initial transferee of such transfer... or (2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial
transferee." Id § 550(a). "Any transfer avoided under [section 547] is preserved for the benefit of
the estate but only with respect to property of the estate." Iad § 551 (1982).
24. See Countryman, supra note 2, at 713 ("[None of the avoiding] powers is of more concern
to prebankruptcy transferees than the trustees power to avoid preferential transfers.'.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982 & Supp. 1111985). The trustee bears the burden of proving that a
transfer is avoidable under § 547(b). Id. § 547(g) (Supp. Inl 1985).
26. A transfer is defined as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary
or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property, including
retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." Id
§ 101(48).
27. A "debt" is defined as a "liability on a claim." Id § 101(1 1) (1982). A "claim" includes a
"right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." Id
§ 101(4)(A).
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(3) while the debtor was insolvent,28 (4) within ninety days before the
Mlng of the bankruptcy petition,2 9 and if it (5) enables the creditor to

receive more than the creditor would otherwise receive in a Chapter 7
liquidation of the debtor's property assuming the transfer had not been
made. 30 Section 547(b) thus deems preferential any transfer by an insolA payment is on account of an antecedent debt if the transfer of payment is deemed made after
the debt was incurred. Section 547(e) indicates when a transfer of payment is deemed to be made.
II U.S.C. § 547(e) (1982 & Supp. 1I 1985). If the transfer was made prior to or contemporaneously
with the incurrence of the debt, then the transfer is not on account of an antecedent debt. D. BAIRD
& T. JAcKsoN, supra note 13, at 284-85.
28. An entity is "insolvent" if the "sum of such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's
property, at a fair valuation, exclusive of-Q() property transferred ...with intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud such entity's creditors; and (ii) property that may be exempted from property of the

estate." 11 U.S.C. § 101(29)(A) (Supp. I 1985).
The debtor is presumed to be insolvent during the 90-day period preceding the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. Id. § 547(f) (1982). Ifthe presumption of insolvency is rebutted by a creditor,
the trustee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor was insolvent at the time
of the transfer. See Sandoz v. Fred Wilson Drilling Co. (Inre Emerald Oil Co.), 695 F.2d 833, 83739 (5th Cir. 1983); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY 1 547.26, at 547-109 to 547-110 (15th ed. 1985).
29. The trustee can attack a transfer to an "insider" within one year prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. In the case of a corporate debtor, an insider is defined to include a director,
officer, or person in control of the debtor, IIU.S.C. § 101(28)(B)o-(ii) (Supp. III 1985), and in the
case of an individual debtor, an insider is defined to include a relative of the debtor. Id.
§ 101(28)(A)(). In the case of a transfer made to an insider between 90 days and one year prior to
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the trustee does not have the benefit of a statutory presumption
of insolvency, but must prove that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. See id
§ 547(f) (1982) (presumption of insolvency extends back only 90 days). Prior to 1984, the insidertransferee must also have had "reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time of
such transfer." Id. § 547(b)(4)(0)(h) (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(b)(2), 98 Stat. 333, 378. It has been suggested that
the removal of the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement for transfers to insiders was not intentional, but rather a "legislative accident." Countryman, supra note 2, at 732.
30. The transfer to an unsecured or undersecured creditor is preferential, assuming, as is the

case in virtually all bankruptcy proceedings, that upon liquidation the debtar's assets are not sufficient to satisfy the claims of a creditors in fall. A folly secured creditor would be entitled to receive
the value of its collateral in a Chapter 7 proceeding; it would therefore not be better off as a result of
payment. See, ag., Roemelmeyer v. Walter E. Heller & Co. (In re Lackow Bros.), 752 F.2d 1529,
1531 (1 1th Cir. 1985); A.I. Credit Corp. v. Drabkin (Inre Auto-Train Corp.), 49 Bankr. 605, 609-10
(D.D.C. 1985); Armstrong v. Hustad (Inre Flaten), 50 Bankr. 186, 195-96 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985);
Braunstein v. Eastern Airline Employees Fed. Credit Union (In re Fitzgerald), 49 Bankr. 62, 65
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); Erman v. Armco, Inc. (In re Formed Tubes, Inc.), 41 Bankr. 819, 821-22
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); In re Santoro Excavating, Inc., 32 Bankr. 947, 948 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1983); 2 D. COWANS, COWANS BANKRUpTCY LAW PRACnXCE § 10.7, at 130-31 (1986).
The fully secured creditor must not only comply with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code regarding attachment and perfection of its security interest, but must also take care that its
security interest is perfected promptly after its creation in accordance with the requirements of 11
U.S.C. § 547(e) (1982 & Supp. HI1985). The Bankruptcy Code provides that a transfer of a security
interest takes effect between the transferor and transfcree at the time the transfer is made if the
transfer is perfected an or within 10 days after the transfer is made. Id. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1982). The
transfer is made at the time the transfer is perfected if the transfer is perfected more than 10 days
after the transfer is made. Id. § 547(e)(2)(B). The transfer is deemed to be made immediately before
the date of the filing
of the bankruptcy petition if the transfer is not perfected at the later of the
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vent debtor during the preference period that gives a creditor an advantage over the other creditors who must look to the remaining assets of
the debtor for the satisfaction of their claims.
Section 547(c) 31 sets forth seven exceptions that may limit the
trustee's ability to avoid some transfers pursuant to section 547(b). The
ordinary course of business exception, section 547(c)(2), as amended in
1984, provides:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer
(2) to the extent that such transfer was(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; and
32
(C) made according to ordinary business terms.

It is easy to draw some explicit distinctions from the text of section
547(c)(2). Two of the three "ordinary" requirements, sections
547(c)(2)(B) and (C), relate to the transfer of payment; the remaining
requirement, section 547(c)(2)(A), relates to the incurrence of the underlying debt. In applying section 547(c)(2), however, most courts have not
33
carefully distinguished the separate requirements.
commencement of the case or 10 days after the transfer takes effect between the transferor and the
transferee. Id § 547(e)(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. HI 1985). In addition, a transfer is deemed not to be
made until the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred. rd § 547(e)(3) (1982).
A transfer to an undersecured creditor is a preference. If the payment had not been made, then
upon the debtor's bankruptcy the creditor's claim is considered to be two separate claims: a secured
claim "to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the... property... [and] an unsecured
claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest... is less than the amount of such
allowed claim." Idi § 506(a). Thus,
to the extent that a creditor possesses an allowable secured claim... it cannot be the
recipient of a preference.... To the extent that the same creditor's claim is unsecured,
however, the claim must be considered in the class of general creditors, subject to rules of
priority where applicable, and entitled to distribution only pro rata with other general
claims.
Armstrong v.Marine Bank Dane County (In re Prescott), 51 Bankr. 751, 754-55 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1985); accord Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1981); Auto-Train Corp.,
49 Bankr. at 611; Countryman, supra note 2, at 744. But see Taylor v. Fairhope Floor Covering &
Interiors (In re K. Pritchard Co.), 17 Bankr. 508, 509 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1981) (criticizing Barash
because it "assumes that (a) the creditor receiving the pre-petition transfer has filed a claim in the
proceeding and (b) upon distribution of the estate its prior recovery on the debt would be ignored").
31. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1982 & Supp. I1 1985). The creditor bears the burden of proving that
its entitlement comes within one of the section 547(c) exceptions. Id. § 547(g) (Supp. 11 1985).
32. Id § 547(c)(2) (Supp. M 1985).
33. Soon after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was passed, commentators recognized the
interpretive problem of determining whether the ordinary course requirements had been met. See
Countryman, Bankruptcy Preferences-CurrentLaw and ProposedChanges, 11 U.C.C. LJ.95, 102
(1978); Weintraub & Resnick, supra note 13, at 266; Young, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of1978, 54 AM. BANR. L.L 221, 228-29 (1980); see also Note,Avoidance ofPreferential
Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 65 IowA L. REv. 209, 236 (1979) ("If not
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The two requirements relating to the transfer of payment can be best
understood as an attempt to inhibit creditors from scrambling for advantage and debtors from preferring one creditor over others for no justifiable reason. Unusual circumstances surrounding a transfer justify
questioning whether the transfer ispreferential. Section 547(c)(2)(B) focuses on unusual payment circumstances by requiring that payment of
the debt be "made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs
of the debtor and the transferee." 34 What is "ordinary" is judged by
considering the prior course of dealings between the debtor and the creditor.3 5 Courts generally find that late, early, or inflated payments are not
made in the ordinary course of business. 36 Payments that are several
days late, however, may be in the ordinary course of business if late payment is routinely accepted by the creditor.3 7 If the debtor pays substantially later than the established late payment period, however, the
payment will probably not be considered made in the ordinary course of
38
business.
narrowly construed, the 'ordinary course' exception could provide a loophole that would significantly weaken the entire structure of the preference law.").
The majority of cases, however, addressed only the question whether the 45-day requirement
had been met. One commentator reports that "[o]f the cases reported in the first 40 volumes of
West's Bankruptcy Reporter, which dealt with § 547(c)(2), the 45-day requirement appears to have
been raised three times more frequently than all the other requirements of that subsection combined." Nutovic, The Bankruptcy PreferenceLaws InterpretingCode Sections 547(c)(2), 550(a)(1),
and 546(a)(1), 41 Bus. LAw. 175, 177 n.1l (1985); see also Aguillard v. Bank of Lafayette (In re
Bourgeois), 58 Bankr. 657, 658 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) (before 45-day requirement was eliminated,
most litigation focused on determining when debt was "incurred," not on other elements of section
547(c)(2)); Ewald Bros. v. Kraft, Inc. (In re Ewald Bros.), 45 Bankr. 52, 56-57 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1984) (most litigation under section 547(c)(2) has focused on 45-day requirement and few decisions
have addressed other elements of the exception); Duncan, supra note 13, at 88-89 (pre-1984 cases
focused on application of 45-day rule, providing little guidance as to meaning of "ordinary course'.
After the 45-day requirement was removed, concern shifted to the ordinary course of bnsiness
requirements. See D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supranote 13, at 319; T. CRANDAL, R. HAGEDORN &
F. SMrr, DErBTOR-CREDITOR LAW MANUAL 16.04[/][b], at 16-32 to 16-33 & n.75 (1985);
DeSimone, supra note 13, at 113 nn.152-53; Dunham & Price, supra note 13, at 509; Herbert, supra
note 13, at 204; Nutovie, supra, at 181-86; Wentraub & Resnick, supra note 13, at 266.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B) (Supp. I 1985).
35. See, eg., In re Magic Circle Energy Corp., 64 Bankr. 269, 273 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986);
Newton v. Ed's Supply Co. (In re White), 58 Bankr. 266,269-70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); Production Steel, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp. ofAm. (In re Production Steel, Inc.), 54 Bankr. 417,423 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1985); Ewald Bros, 45 Bankr. at 57.
36. See, eg., Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (In re Craig Oil Co.), 785 F.2d 1563, 1567-68 (11th
Cir. 1986); ProductionSteel, 54 Bankr. at 424; Ledford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (In re Williams), 5
Bankr. 706, 707 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980).
37. See CraigOil Co., 785 F.2d at 1567 (in light of parties prior course of dealing, payments
within six days after due date were ordinary).
38. See id.; Ewald Bros., 45 Bankr. at 59 (payments that were seven, nine, and twelve days Late
were not in ordinary course of business where creditor previously had accepted payments one or two
days after they were due).
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The requirement of section 547(c)(2)(C) that the payment be "made
according to ordinary business terms" 39 is less clear. Unlike sections
547(c)(2)(A) and (B), section 547(c)(2)(C) does not refer to the ordinary
course between the "debtor and the transferee."' 4 This omission sug-

gests that the business terms of the transaction must be ordinary in an
objective sense. Thus, the transfer must coincide with industry practice, 41 as well as the debtor's and transferee's practices in making and
accepting payments. 42 If the transfer is inconsistent with objective industry standards, doubt is cast on the claim that the transfer was in the
ordinary course of the debtor's and transferee's business. Despite their
ambiguities, the two provisions relating to the transfer of payment are
designed to ensure that neither the debtor nor the creditor does anything
out of the ordinary to gain advantage over other creditors. 43
Section 547(c)(2)(A)'s requirement that the underlying debt be "incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs
of the debtor and the transferee" 44 is more problematic, since it seems
divorced from the notion of preserving equality and preventing creditor
or debtor misbehavior. The few cases decided under section 547(c)(2)(A)
have involved the requirement that the loan be in the ordinary course of
business of the transferee. Although the ordinary course of business for a
bank includes the extension of credit, 45 courts have found that loans by
Section 547(c)(2)(B)'s reference to the ordinary course of the "financial affair" as well as the
"business" of the debtor and the transferee may appear to expand the exception. Congress inserted
the "financial affairs" language, however, to clarify that the exception also protects consumers in
noncommercial transactions for whom the "ordinary course of business" language would not be
applicable. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 373, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6329; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5874.

39. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(C) (Supp. HI 1985).
40. Id. § 547(c)(2)(A)-(B).
41. See In re Magic Circle Energy Corp., 64 Bankr. 269, 275 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986); Production Steel, Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp. of Am. (In re Production Steel, Inc.), 54 Bankr. 417, 424
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985).
42. See Sassoon v. International Multifoods Corp. (In re Coastal Fisheries, Inc.), 57 Bankr.
657, 659 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986).
43. See Marathon Oi Co. v. Flatau (In re Craig Oil Co.), 785 F.2d 1563, 1566 (1lth Cir. 1986)
(section 547(c)'s ordinary course of business requirements evince congressional intent to protect
payments that "do not result from 'unusual' debt collection or payment practices"); Campbell v.
Cannington (In re Economy Milling Co.), 37 Bankr. 914, 922 (D.S.C. 1983) ("[O]nly unusual or
abnormal actions by the parties to collect or pay on an existing debt are proscribed."); Production
Steel, 54 Bankr. at 423 ('The exercise of leverage by [the creditor] in the ways indicated takes this
transaction out of the class of ordinary course transactions intended to be protected by
§ 547(e)(2).").
44. ItU.S.C. § 547(o)(2)(A) (Supp. 1I 1985) (emphasis added).
45. In re Cascade Oil Co., 51 Bankr. 877, 882 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1985); see also Aguillard v.
Bank of Lafayette (In re Bourgeois), 58 Bankr. 657, 660 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) ("long-term loans
may be ordinary to the banks").
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shareholders or insiders are not in the ordinary course of the shareholder's or insider's business 4 6 If the debtor must borrow from such an
unusual source, this may indicate that more conventional financing is not

available because the debtor is in poor financial condition.
The requirement that the loan also be incurred in the ordinary
course of the debtor's business has received even less judicial attention.
Presumably, a loan from a source not usually used by the debtor, such as
a loan shark, will not be deemed incurred in the ordinary course of the

debtor's business.47 As originally enacted, section 547(c)(2) excepted
from avoidance only payments made within forty-five days of a debt's

incurrence. Therefore, the courts did not have to consider whether a
long-term debt could be incurred in the ordinary course of the debtor's
business. Following the removal of the forty-five day requirement in
1984, courts must now face that question. 48
The Code does not define the phrase "ordinary course of business"
and other sections that employ the phrase give little guidance as to its

meaning.4 9 In Aguillard v. Bank of Lafayette (In re Bourgeois),50 the
only case under amended section 547(c)(2) to discuss whether long-term
debt may be incurred in the ordinary course of business, 51 the bankruptcy court concluded that a long-term debt was not incurred by the
debtor in the ordinary course of its business. 52 Unfortunately, the re46. See, eg., Waldschmidt v. Ranier (In re Fulghum Constr. Corp.), 45 Bankr. 112, 116
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); Carter v. Pickens (In re Arctic Air Conditioning, Inc.), 35 Bankr. 107,
110 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983).
47. See Dunham & Price, supra note 13, at 500.
48. Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character,and the History of the Voidable
Preference,39 STAN. L. REv. 3, 133 (1986) ("The next great statutory episode in preference law may
*.. be an essentially common law effort to create some criteria for determining when credit transactions meet the norm of 'the ordinary course.' ". Most commentators believe that payments on longterm debt may be protected from avoidance by amended section 547(c)(2). See supra note 13.
49. Cf. Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants and/or Creditors v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In
re Jobns-Manville Corp.), 60 Bankr. 612, 616 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[Neither the Code nor the
legislative history of § 363 provide any test or guidelines for identifying an ordinary course
transaction.').
50. 58 Bankr. 657 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986).
51. Two other reported cases discuss the treatment of payments on long-term debt. The bankruptcy court in In re Technology for Energy Corp., 56 Bankr. 307, 317 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985),
stated that if a bank creditor was deemed an insider so that payments to it within one year prior to
debtor's bankruptcy could be attacked as preferential, section 547(c)(2) might protect from avoidance those payments that were "routine installments." In the second case, In re Magic Circle Energy Corp., 64 Bankr. 269, 273-75 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986), the bankruptcy court held that
payment of a long-term promissory note executed pursuant to workout of overdue trade receivables
was in the ordinary course of business of the debtor because the workout of overdue trade credit was
ordinary in the troubled oil and gas industry. The court in Magic Circle did not hold that a longterm debt could be incurred in the ordinary course of business, since the debt was a short-term trade
debt when originally incurred.
52. Bourgeois, 58 Bankr. at 660.
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ported opinion provides few of the facts surrounding the transfer, other
than that the loan was long-term and the creditor was a bank. Nonetheless, the court stated that long-term loans are
a form of capitalization which is not generally part of the debtor's day
to day business activities. Thus, although long-term loans may be ordinary to the banks, they are not the ordinary course of business of the
debtor within the meaning of... section 547(c)(2). "Ordinary course"
refers to the debtor's normal business operations
of selling goods or
53
providing services, not borrowing money.
To determine whether the result reached by the court in Bourgeoisis
correct, it is necessary to examine the legislative history and the policies
of the preference provision and the ordinary course of business exception.
I.

THE HISTORY OF THE ORDINARY COURSE
OF BUSINESS EXCEPTION

Congress hastily eliminated the forty-five day requirement from the
ordinary course of business exception,5 4 and the legislative history accompanying the 1984 amendments is scant. Neither the House nor the
Senate held hearings on the bill. No House or Senate report was issued
to accompany the bill, and the Conference Report contains only the text
of the bill and no joint explanatory statement.5 5 In the absence of any
direct indication of congressional intent to expand the coverage of section 547(c)(2) to include protection of payments on long-term debt, one
must consider the fundamental changes in the bankruptcy law made by
Congress in 197856 as well as the legislative proposals discussed by Congress between the enactment of the Code in 1978 and the 1984 amendments to determine the proper interpretation of the amended section.
A.

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the 1898 Act),5 7 was the first signifi53. I

54. The hasty elimination of the 45-day requirement was due in part to Congress's preoccupation with the jurisdictional crisis facing the bankruptcy court system. See supra note 11.
55. See H.R. CoN. REP. No. 882, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 576.
56. For a general discussion of the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
see H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 5963-65; Butler, A Congressman'sReflectons on the Draftingof the Bankruptcy Code of
1978, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 557 (1980); Klee, LegislativeHistory ofthe New BankruptcyLaw, 28
Dn PAUL L. REv. 941 (1979). virtually every document relating to the legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is collected in BANKRUtTcy REFORM Acr OF 1978: A LEGISLATIVE HisroRY (A. Resnick & E. Wypyski eds. 1979).
57. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
§ 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
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cant bankruptcy legislation of the United States. As amended, it remained in effect for eighty years.5 8 The 1898 Act was designed to help
the debtor seek discharge from debts and to treat the debtor's creditors in
an equal manner in the division of the debtor's assets.5 9 The trustees
avoiding powers, including the section 60 power to avoid a preferential
transfer of property by the debtor to a creditor, furthered the equality of
distribution principle.
Section 60a defined a preference as:
a transfer... of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of
a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made... by such
debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or
against him of the petition [in bankruptcy] ... the effect of which
transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage
of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.6 0
The trustee could avoid a preferential transfer pursuant to section 60b,
however, only if the creditor receiving the transfer had, at the time the
transfer was made, "reasonable cause to believe that the debtor [was]
insolvent." 61 This requirement reflected Congress's reluctance to interfere with ordinary business transactions made in good faith.6 2 Thus, the
provision gave some measure of security to creditors who were unaware
of the debtor's insolvency.6 3 For example, transfers involving the
debtor's payment of a routine bill, such as a monthly utility bill, were
protected by section 60b because the creditor usually lacked reasonable
4
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
The 1898 Act did not contain any explicit exceptions to sections 60a
and 60b. A judicially created "current expense" rule, however, was developed in cases involving creditor allegations regarding the debtor's intent to prefer. Creditors filing an involuntary petition under the 1898
Act were required to establish that the debtor had committed one or
58. Prior to the 1898 Act, Congress had enacted three short-lived national bankruptcy laws:

the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248;
the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch.9, 5 Stat. 440, repealedby Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614;
and the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealedby Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20
Stat. 99.
59. 3 COLuER ON BANKRUPTCY 60.01, at 743 (14th ed. 1974).
60. Bankruptcy Act § 60a, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (1976) (repealed 1978).
61. Ird§ 60b, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (repealed 1978).
62. 3 COLLER ON BAN upTcy 60.52[2], at 1056 (14th ed. 1974).
63. Queenan, The PreferenceProvisionsof the PendingBankruptcy Law, 82 COM. LJ.465, 467
(1977); Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Three Views on PreferencesandAfter-Acquired
Property, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 292, 292 (1967).
64. See, g., In re Douglas Coal & Coke Co., 131 F. 769, 778 (E.D. Tenn. 1904); see also
Morris, Bankruptcy Law Reform: Preference. Secret Liens and FloatingLiens, 54 MINN. L. RBv.
737, 762-63 (1970).
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more acts of bankruptcy. 65 Prior to 1952, a debtor's preferential transfer
for the benefit of a creditor was an act of bankruptcy if the petitioning
creditors could show that the debtor intended to prefer the transferee. 6 6
Under the current expense rule, the petitioning creditors could not establish that the debtor intended a preference if the debtor made a payment
for a current expense. Rather, the debtor was held to be merely making
"ordinary" payments or payments necessary to the continuation of the
business. 67 In addition, some courts and commentators interpreting the
1898 Act recognized the current expense rule as an exception to the definition of an antecedent debt. 68 These courts and commentators apparently believed that "ordinary," short-term transactions should not be
65. 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 3.03, at 404 (14th ed. 1974).
66. Id. ii 3.01[3], 3.206. After 1952, a preferential transfer, as defined in section 60, was
treated as an act of bankruptcy which provided a basis for filing an involuntary petition in bankruptcy under the 1898 Act. Bankruptcy Act § 3a(2), as amended by Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 579,
§ 3(a), 66 Stat. 420, 421, II U.S.C. § 21a(2) (1976) (repealed 1978).
67. See Goodlander-Robertson Lumber Co. v. Atwood, 152 F. 978, 979 (4th Cir. 1907); Richmond Standard Steel Spike & Iron Co. v. Allen, 148 F. 657, 662 (4th Cir. 1906); In re E.T. Russell
Co., 291 F. 809, 813-14 (D. Mass. 1923); In re Columbia Real Estate Co., 205 F. 980, 982 (D.NJ.
1913); In re Hallin, 199 F. 806, 808 (W.D. Mich. 1912); In re Morgan & Williams, 184 F. 938, 94041 (N.D. Ga. 1911); In re Perlhefter, 177 F. 299, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1910); In re Douglas Coal & Coke
Co., 131 F. 769, 776 (E.D. Tenn. 1904).
It has been suggested that this line of cases was relied on, "with no help from, or regard for, the
language of [section 60]," by the few conrts that also held that payments of current expenses were
not preferences under section 60, Countryman, supra note 2, at 768, and that these cases in turn led
the influential Collier bankruptcy treatise to declare that "payments on account of current expenses
... are generally not within the category of preferential transfers." 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
60.23, at 873 (14th ed. 1974), quoted in Countryman, supra note 2, at 768.
68. See Marshall v. Florida NaVI Bank, 112 F.2d 380, 381-82 (5th Cir. 1940) (payment to
warehouse company for storage charges "was made in the usual course of business and did not
constitute a preference voidable under Section 60, sub. b"); In re Macklem, 22 F.2d 426, 427 (D.
Md. 1927) ("[P]ayments of currently maturing liabilities in such comparatively small amounts as
these are probably not preferential payments in any event."); In re Foley, 140 F. 300, 302 (ED. Pa.
1905) (indicating that a payment of a current expense may not be on account of an antecedent debt);
Zelman v. Esher (In re C.S. Mersick & Co.), I Bankr. 599, 601-02 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1979) (rent
payments made during month in which they were due were not on account of antecedent debt); 3
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY %60.19, at 852-53 (14th ed. 1974) (advancements upon security for
current business operations or expenses does not effect preference); id. 160.23, at 873 (payments on
account of current expenses incidental to business operations not generally considered preferential);
Anderson, In re Iowa Premium Service Co.: When isa Debt Incurred Under 547(c)(2) ofthe Bankruptcy Code 17 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1075, 1084 n.56 (1984) ("The 'current expense' rule rested in
large part on the recognition that payments for such expenses are not really for an 'antecedent debt'
because they do not diminish the estate."); Kaye, Preferences Under the New Bankruptcy Code 54
AM. BANKR. L.". 197, 202 (1980) ("The underlying rationale of [section 547(cX2) and the cnrrent
expense rule] isthe same: no diminution of the estate, payment not for antecedent debt, and allowing the debtor to stay in business."); Teague, Installment Payments as Voidable Preferences
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 OKLA. BJ. 2797, 2801-02 (1982) (eTherewas no
exception for normal business or financial affairs transactions under the Act, but courts often allowed an exception .. . based on the principle that current expenses were not antecedent debts.").
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subject to attack in bankruptcy.6 9
The 1898 Act did not draw a distinction between the avoidability of
preferential payments on short-term debt and preferential payments on
long-term debt, although as a general matter payments on long-term debt
were more likely to be found avoidable than payments on short-term

debt. A long-term creditor, such as a bank creditor, might be more likely
to have reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent than a short-term
creditor, such as a trade creditor, because a bank is more likely to monitor the debtor's financial condition.70 Not all payments to bank creditors
were avoidable, however, because the bank creditor might not have reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent if the financial information it monitored was unreliable or was not available until long after the
payment was received. 71 Thus, under the 1898 Act the avoidability of a
payment on a long-term debt depended on the quality and timeliness of
the information available to the creditor about the debtor's financial condition. 72 In most cases a timely payment on a short-term debt, such as
69. See, ag., Blauvelt v. Walker, 72 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1934) (payments of wages not preferences); Ward & Shulman, In Defense of the Bankruptcy Code'sRadicalIntegrationof the Preference
Rules Affecting Commercial Financing, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 19-20 (1983) (wage payments and
monthly payments to trade creditors and utility companies are "ordinary and important transactions" that should not be treated as preferences).
70. See W. HILLMAN, COMMERCIAL LOAN DOCUMENTATION 46 (2d ed. 1986) (borrower is
commonly required to furnish periodic financial statements).
71. See Farmers Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d 314, 326 (8th Cir.) (bank creditor did not have reasonable cause to believe debtor was insolvent in part because it had received financial statements
from debtor indicating a positive net worth), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967). A typical loan
agreement covenant would require that the debtor (the "Company") furnish the creditor (the
"Bank")
within ninety (90) days after the end of each fiscal year of the Company, copies of balance
sheets of the Company... as at the close of such fiscal year and statements of income and
retained earnings of the Company... for such year, certified by independent public accountants selected by the Company and satisfactory to the Bank.
W. HILLMAN, supra note 70, at 45; accord COMMITFEE ON DEVELOPMENTS INBuSINEss FINANCING, TERM LOAN HANDBOOK 238 (J.
McCann ed. 1983). Quarterly reporting is also usually required within 30 to 60 days after the end of each quarter but quarterly financial statements need only
be certified by a principal financial officer of the debtor. Iad at 237; W. HILLMAN, supra note 70, at
45.
72. In many cases, the bank creditor who had information concerning the debtor's finances was
found to have received a voidable preference because it had reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor was insolvent. See Clower v. First State Bank, 343 F.2d 808, 810 (5th Cir. 1965) (debtor's
loan had been extended numerons times); Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Quittner, 176 F.2d 997, 999
(9th Cir. 1949) (debtor had overdrafts and payment on note was overdue); Coombs v. Merchants
Bank, 161 F.2d 858, 859-60 (2d Cir. 1947) (evidence showed debtor company was insolvent at time
of loan payments); First Wis. Nat'I Bank v. Charness, 73 F.2d 730, 731 (7th Cir. 1934) (bankwas
aware that payments were made from proceeds of "going out of business" sale conducted by debtor);
Pender v. Chatham Phenix Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 58 F.2d 968, 970 (2d Cir. 1932) (debtor was six
months slow inpaying bills, debtor's commercial credit rating had been withdrawn, debtor's bank
balance had dwindled, and bank had required payment of notes before due date); Ridge Ave. Bank v.
Studheim, 145 F. 798, 800 (3d Cir. 1906) (evidence showed that debtor was insolvent at time of
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trade credit, was not avoidable because trade creditors do not usually
monitor the debtor's financial condition to obtain information about the
debtor's solvency after the initial decision to deal on credit has been
made. The trade creditor might also argue that the payment was not on
account of an antecedent debt and hence not preferential under the current expense rule.7 3

B. The Bankruptcy Refonn Act of 1978.
In enacting the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 74 Congress considered two sets of reform proposals: legislation drafted by the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States 75 (the Commission's Bill) 76
transfer); Gelbman v. Canton Nat'l Bank, 150 F. Supp. 804, 806-07 (N.D. Ohio 1957) (debtor had
sold merchandise at huge losses, had overdrawn its bank account, had made payments on loan in
cash, and had failed to provide financial statements as originally contemplated); Irving Trust Co. v.
Textile Banking Co., 3 F. Supp. 816, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) (checks for previous payments had been
returned for insufficient funds and bank had made repeated demands for payment), aff'd mem, 65
F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1933); Cohen v. Tremont Trust Co. (In re Sternburg), 43 Am. Bankr. Rep. 522
(D. Mass. 1918) (debtor had suspended deposits for more than two weeks, had no other depository
accounts, and had asked for larger loans; attachment on debtor's property had just been dissolved).
But other cases have held that payments to a bank creditor could not be avoided because the
bank creditor did not have reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent. See, eg., Farmers
Bank v. Julian, 383 F.2d 314, 326 (8th Cir.) (bank received debtor's financial statements showing
positive net worth and bank extended two additional loans to debtor without perfecting its security
interest), cert. denfed 389 U.S. 1021 (1967); Lang v. First Nat'l Bank, 215 F.2d 118, 120-22 (5th Cir.
1954) (bank knew debtor was having difficulty in meeting current obligations, but it also knew
debtor had several lucrative jobs near completion); Cusick v. Second Nat'l Bank, 115 F.2d 150, 154
(D.C. Cir. 1940) (debtor's financial statements showed assets in excess of liabilities, bank's prior
dealings with debtor had been succesuful, and bank had inquired about debtor's financial situation
and received reasonable explanation); In re Frazin, 201 F. 86, 87-89 (2d Cir. 1912) (bank reasonably
believed debtor had substantial funds deposited at time of transfer); Mack v. Bank of Latsing, 396 F.
Supp. 935, 942 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (insolvency not apparent since debtor overstated accounts
receivable).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
74. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. The law had no official short title,
but is commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
75. The nation's bankruptcy law;, which had been written during the "horse and buggy era of
consumer and commercial credit," H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprintedin 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5963, 5965, needed to be updated due to the tremendous explosion in the amount of outstanding consumer credit and the explosion of commercial credit after the
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Id at 3-4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 5964-65.
Even before the Bankruptcy Commission was formally appointed, it was recognized that the
1898 Act had to be revised. In 1966, the National Bankruptcy Conference established the Committee on Coordination of the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commercial Code. Professor Grant
Gilmore chaired the committee and it issued its report in 1970. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE UNI-

FORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1970), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6164
[hereinafter NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE REPORT].

Congress appointed the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to study and
recommend revisions of the bankruptcy laws. Act ofJuly 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Star. 468.
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and legislation drafted by the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges
(the Judges' Bill).7 7 The preference provision adopted was virtually identical to the preference provision in H.R. 6,7 8 a compromise version of the
Commission's Bill and the Judges' Bill. 79 The Commission's Bill and the
Judges' Bill both recommended elilinating the 1898 Act's "reasonable
cause to believe" requirement, probably the "most litigated question
under the preference provision of the 1898 Act." 0 The requirement was
The Commission presented its report to Congress in 1973. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUpTcy LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1 (1973)
[hereinafter COMMIsSION REPORT]. The report included proposed legislation to replace the 1898

Act. Id. pt. 2.
76. The Commission's Bill was introduced in the House as H.R. 10,792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), and in the Senate as S. 4026, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). It was reintroduced in the House
during the 94th Congress as H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), and in the Senate as S. 236, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
77. The Judges' Bill was originally introduced in the House as H.R. 16,643, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974). It was reintroduced in the House as H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and was introduced in the Senate as S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
78. The only difference was that the H.R. 6 version did not refer to the "financial affairs" ofthe
debtor in addition to the "business" of the debtor. This language was added to later proposals "[flor
the case of a consumer... to include such nonbusiness activities as payment of monthly utility
bills." H.R. REP. No.595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6329; S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5874 Minutes of the Subcomrm. on Civil & ConstitutionalRights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 553 (1977) [hereinafter Mark-Up Minutes ofH.R. 6]
(statement of Mr. Klee) (unpublished transcript held in the Washington and Lee University School
of Law Library).
Although the preference provision remained the same, the proposed legislation took various
forms before it was finally passed by the House and Senate and signed by the President. During the
mark-up of -R.6, an amended LR. 6 was offered as a substitute. The new bill was introduced as
H.R. 7330, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). This bill was further revised in the light ofcomments from
judges, attorneys, and academicians, and a revised version was introduced as H.R. 8200,95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977). After further mark-up and various floor amendments, the House passed H.R. 8200,
124 CONG. REc. 1804 (1978), and the Judiciary Committee issued its report, H.R. REp. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963. Meanwhile, the
Senate considered its own legislation, S.2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), which was accompanied
by a Senate Judiciary report, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 5787. Before the Senate could act on S. 2266, it considered H.R. 8200, as
passed by the House. The Senate amended H.R. 8200 by inserting in its place the text of S. 2266.
124 CONG. REc. 28,284 (1978). TIs amended version of H.R. 8200 was passed by the Senate, id. at
30,960, and sent back to the House. In the House, H.R. 8200 was again amended and then passed.
Id. at 32,420. The Senate then considered the bill as amended by the House and passed the bill after
further minor amendment. Id. at 34,019. The House concurred in the Senate amendments, id. at
34,145, and the legislation, Public Law No. 95-598, was signed by the President.
79. See Klee, supra note 56, at 94546.
80. D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 13, at 284. See Hearingson S. 2266 and H.R. 8200
Before the Subcomm.on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 837 (1977) (statement of Charles Horsky, Chairman, National Bankruptcy
Conference); see alsoHearingson S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. J1, at 430 (1975)
[hereinafter Hearingson S.235 and S. 236] (statement of Richard Kaufman on behalf of the Na-
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criticized, inter alia, for the stringent burden of proof imposed on the
trustee.8 1 The result of the requirement was frequently "protection, due
to lack of proof, for a creditor who well knew the truth of the situation."182 The requirement also failed to provide creditors with an indication of what was permissible behavior because courts used a case-by-case
83
approach that produced inconsistent results.
More importantly, commentators criticized the "reasonable cause to
believe" requirement as inconsistent with the principle of equality of distribution of the debtor's assets among its creditors. As one commentator
stated:
Logically and theoretically, the knowledge of the recipient of the preference has nothing to do with equality of distribution. Equality is determined by the fact that all creditors are being treated reasonably
alike.
So, if two creditors received a payment... and one had knowledge and one did not of the insolvency
of the debtor, that has really no
84
relevancy to equality of treatment.
tional Association of Credit Management) ('Wie foresee the elimination of much wasteful litigation
which presently concerns itself with the dubious issue of the creditor's state of mind ....).
81. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6139; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5792; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 75, pt. 1, at 204; see also

Cyr, Setting the RecordStraightfor a ComprehensiveRevision ofthe BankruptcyAct of1898, 49 AM.
BANKR. L.". 99, 166 (1975) ("The vast majority of preferential transfers are never recovered...
because of the added requirement that the trustee must prove that the transferee had 'reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent' at the time the transfer was made.").
82. 3 COLLER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 60.52[2], at 1056 (14th ed. 1974).
83. See supra note 72; see also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 60.52[2], at 1055 (14th ed. 1974)
("[I0n any consideration of reasonable cause for belief in a debtor's insolvency under § 60b,each ease
must, to a great extent be decided on its own facts."); id q 60.54[1], at 1071 ("Wlhether or not a
creditor receiving a preference has such reasonable cause to believe [that the debtor is insolvent]
must ultimately be determined from the facts of each case."); Clark, Preferences Underthe Old and
New Bankruptcy Acs, 12 U.C.C. L".154, 156 n.7 (1979) (the "reasonable cause to believe" test is
applied on a case-by-case basis); Hagedorn, The Survival and Enforcement of the Secured Claim
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 Am.BANIc L. 1, 10 (1980) ('[T£he Bankruptcy
Act did not specify in what circumstances the reasonable-cause-to-believe fact was to have been
deemed justified, thereby necessitating a case-by-case approach to the problem."); Kohn, Preferential Transfers on the Eve of the Bankruptcy Amendment& 2 PROSPECTUS 259, 268 (1968)
('[R]easonable cause to believe the debtor to be insolvent has provided an often crucial factual
defense ....
';Note, Voidable Preferences An Analysis of the ProposedRevisions of Section 60b of
theBankruptcyAct, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 481, 485-86 "ourts ...have exercised considerable discretion and reached inconsistent results.").
84. Hearingson H.R. 31 and HR. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary: Bankruptcy Act Revision, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 1855
(1976) [hereinafter Hearingson H.R. 31 and H.R. 32] (statement of Leon Forman on behalf of the
National Bankruptcy Conference). See also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6139 ("To argue that the creditor's state of mind
is an important element of a preference and that creditors should not be required to disgorge what
they took in supposed innocence is to ignore the strong bankruptcy policy of equality among credi-
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Predictably, lenders objected to eliminating the "reasonable cause to

believe" requirement because it would be unfair to creditors who were
unaware of the debtor's insolvency.85 In addition, a creditor would have
to remit a payment unless it could prove "at considerable expense" that
the debtor was not insolvent. 86 The cost of such proof could be "exorbitant" and "would result in higher loan cost[s] to the borrower. 87T Nor
would the benefit to the other creditors justify the cost to the transfereecreditor, because only a "small portion" of recovered funds would be
available to the general unsecured creditors after payment of administrative expenses and distributions to priority claimants.8 8

Despite the lenders' objections, Congress accepted the recommendations of the Commission's Bill and the Judges' Bill89 and eliminated the
tors."); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 75, pt. 1, at 19 ("Therequirement that there be a certain
state of mind on the part of the favored creditor has [no] rational connection with the objective of
this provision, le, to achieve a more equitable distribution among all of the creditors."); 3 COLLIER
ON BA.i.RuiyrcY fT60.52[2], at 1056 (14th ed. 1974) (elimination of requirement would remove
opportunity for inequitable treatment of creditors where proof of reasonable cause for belief has
failed).
The trustee was required to prove not the actual state of the creditor's mind, but whether a
reasonable person in the position of the creditor, knowing what the creditor knew about the debtor's
financial condition, would have cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. See Herzog v. Mandan Sec. Bank (In re PRS Prods., Inc.), 574 F.2d 414, 417 (8th Cir. 1978) (debtor's balance sheet
provided evidence of insolvency, creditor's records indicated debtor had overdrawn liue of credit on
many occasions, and creditor could have learned of debtor's insolvency from independent sources);
Yorke v. Thomas Iseri Produce Co., 418 F.2d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 1969) (debtor was three months late
on payments routinely due within month of delivery, creditor knew that debtor was in financial
trouble, debtor requested that creditor keep information regarding debtor's financial condition confidential, and attempts by creditor to contact debtor proved unsuccessful); Kravetz v. Joange Bldg.
Corp., 341 F.2d 561, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1965) (debtor had overdue notes, defaulted in rental payments,
quit business, and intended to leave stock-in-trade and fixtures on landlord-creditor's premises).
85. Hearingson H. 31 and HR.32, supra note 84, pt. 4, at 2491 (statement ofJohn Ingraham on behalf of Robert Morris Assocs.) ("In our view it is patently unfair to prejudice a commercial lender who receives a transfer within three months, in good faith, without knowledge of, or
reason to believe that, the debtor is insolvent."). Further testimony indicated:
[Miany of our banker friends are disturbed over the removal of the necessity for the trustee
to prove that the preferred creditors had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was
insolvent. Perhaps we should also ask whether it is necessary to cause [the preference
provision] to bear quite so heavily on one set of creditors-the lenders.
a pt. 1, at 397 (statement of Peter Coogan). See alsoHearingson S. 235 and,S 236,supra note 80,
pt. II, at 457 (statement of Robert Grimmig on behalf of the American Bankers Ass'n); Hearingson
HR 31 and HIL 32, supra note 84, pt. 3, at 1749 (same).
86. Hearingson S. 235 andS 236, supra note 80, pt. 11, at 457 (statement of Robert Grimmig);
Hearingson H.IL 31 and H.IL 3Z supra note 84, pt. 3, at 1749 (same).
87. Hearingson S. 235 andS. 236,supra note 80, pt. H1, at 457 (statement of Robert Grimmig);
Hearingson H.IL 31 and H.R. 32, supra notc 84, pt. 3, at 1749 (same).
88. Hearingson S. 235and S. 236,supra note 80, pt. 1I, at 457 (statement of Robert Grimmig);
Hearingson H.R. 31 and H.IL 32, supra note 84, pt. 3, at 1749 (same).
89. See COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 75, pt. 1, at 20 ("[Ihe Commission recommends
that... [tlhe requirement that the trustee prove in order to avoid a preferential transfer, that the
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"reasonable cause to believe" requirement. 90 In addition, Congress included a provision creating a presumption that the debtor was insolvent
during the preference period. 9 ' These statutory requirements meant that

a trustee could avoid any payment received by an unsecured creditor
from an insolvent debtor on account of an antecedent debt ninety days
before bankruptcy. 92
By eliminating the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement, Congress deliberately shifted from a policy of avoiding only those preferential
transfers that were made to creditors who had reason to know of the
debtor's insolvency and may have therefore exerted pressure on the

debtor, to a policy of preserving equal distribution, even in the absence of
creditor pressure. In recognition of the potential harshness of this shift,
Congress ultimately created six exceptions to protect certain payments
which, though technically preferential, were believed worthy of protection from avoidance. 93 One of the exceptions adopted in the 1978 Code
creditor had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer be
eliminated.").
90. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs 5963, 6139; S. Rm. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 5787, 5792. The "reasonable cause to believe" requirement was retained
with respect to transfers to insiders between 90 days and one year preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See supra note 29. This requirement was removed in 1984, although this removal
may have been unintended. See id
The Committee on Coordination of the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commercial Code
recommended that the National Bankruptcy Conference study whether the "reasonable cause to
believe" requirement should be modified. The Committee's report stated that most of its members
felt that "some relaxation of the 'reasonable cause to believe' requirement would be desirable." NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONEERENCE REPORT, supra note 75, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 6170. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States also recommended that "this requirement for a voidable preference be eliminated." COMMiSSiON REPORT,
supra note 75, pt. 1, at 20.
91. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1982). The House Report explained the difficulty with the 1898 Act's
requirement that the trustee prove that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer:
Given the state of most debtor's books and records, [proving the debtor insolvent] is nearly
impossible. Given the financial condition of nearly all debtors in the three months before
bankruptcy, the task is also generally not worth the effort. Rarely is a debtor solvent
during the three months before bankruptcy. Thus, the preference section requires the
trustee to prove a fact that nearly always exists yet never can be proved with certainty.
This factor leads to far fewer preference recoveries than otherwise would be the case. Because of the difficulty of proof, creditors are not deterred from the race of diligence, and the
policy of equality is defeated.
H.R. REP.No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist
Sess. 178, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5963, 6138-39.
92. See Dunham & Price, supra note 13, at 493 (amendment converted payments during statutory period of presumed insolvency into preferences); see also Fortgang & King, The 1978 Bankruptcy Code: Some Wrong Policy Decisions, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1148, 1166 (1981) (almost any
transfer from debtor to creditor within 90-day period is assumed to be for an antecedent debt).
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); see also ComMISSIoN REPORT, supra note
75, pt. 1, at 201 (recommending that certain transfers, such as those of less than $1000 value, absolute sales, payments for personal services, and payments for recently incurred utility and inventory
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was, of course, that for a payment of a debt made in the ordinary course
of business and within forty-five days of the debt's incurrence. 94 The
ordinary course of business exception appears to be derived from proposals for protecting from avoidance payments made shortly after the debt's

incurrence. It has also been suggested that the exception was derived
from the current expense exception recognized under the 1898 Act,95

although the legislative history of the 1978 Code does not refer to the
current expense rule.
The House and Senate Reports stated that "[t]he purpose of [the

forty-five day] exception is to leave undisturbed normal financial relations, because it does not detract from the general policy of the prefer-

ence section [which is] to discourage unusual action by either the debtor
or his creditors during the debtor's slide into bankruptcy." 96 Apparently

the forty-five day provision was a result of the House Judiciary Committee's judgment that thirty days represented the normal credit term and
that an additional period of time should be allowed for a creditor to prepare and send a bill and for the bill to be paid by return mail. A committee staff member noted that rather than attempt to define antecedent
97
debt,
expenses, be excepted from preference attack); fd pt. 2, at 169-70 n.6 (payments to employees, trade
creditors, and utilities in the ordinary course of business should be protected since creditors receiving
payments "ordinarily do not have reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent").
94. See IIU.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982), amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(c), 98 Stat. 333, 378.
95. See eg., Wickham v. United Am. Bank (In re Property Leasing & Management, Inc.), 46
Bankr. 903, 914 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985); Countryman, supra note 2, at 767-68; Kaye, supra note
68, at 201-02.
96. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 373, reprinted in 1978 US. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6329; SEN. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5874.
97. The Commission's proposal defined an antecedent debt as "a debt incurred more than five
days before a transfer paying or securing the debt." COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 75, pt. 2, at
168 (proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, § 4-607(g)(1)). The definition of antecedent debt excepted
debts for personal services, debts for utilities incurred within three months of the petition, and debts
for inventory paid for within three months of the delivery of the goods in the ordinary course of the
debtor's business. Id In addition, proposed section 4-607(g)(1)(D) excepted from the definition of
antecedent debt "an obligation to transfer ownership arising out of a contract for the sale of property
owned by the debtor and in existence either at the date the contract was entered into or at a time
more than three months prior to the petition." IadIronically, the Commission justified protection
of these payments, although technically payments on acconnt of an antecedent debt, on the basis of
the discarded "reasonable cause to believe" requirement- "employees, trade creditors, and utilities
ordinarily do not have reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent." Id at 169-70 n.6 (citing
Morris, supra note 64, at 761-65, 767-68). The Commission believed that "antecedent debt" should
"be defined so as to exclude certain debts the payment ofwhich does not infringe substantially on the
goals of the preference provisions" Id. pt. 1, at 205.
The National Bankruptcy Conference viewed the Commission's proposal as "much too rigid"
and argued in favor of a more flexible standard that would exclude "from the definition of antecedent debt a debt which is intended to be paid or secured contemporaneously with the incurring of it

98
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[we] decided that what was really important was whether things were
going on in the ordinary course of business and, if they were going on
within the ordinary course of business, what was a reasonable time?
And we took the most extreme ordinary case we could think of where
goods ... were ordered on the first of the month and a bill was sent out
if in fact it is paid or secured substantially contemporaneously with the incurring of it." Hearingson
HR. 31 andH.R. 32, supra note 84, app. at 364. The exceptions to the definition of an "antecedent
debt" were also criticized for affording special treatment to "special interest group[s] or particular
type[s] of claim[s]," contrary to the bankruptcy policy of treating all claimants on a pro rata basis.
d pt. 3, at 1658 (statement of L.E. Creel, III, on behalf of the Dallas Bar Association). The Conference also criticized the exclusion of all debts for personal services from the definition of an antecedent debt as "much too broad." Id. app. at 364. Finally, the Conference argued that the exception
for debts incurred for utilities or inventory within three months of bankruptcy granted too long of a
protected period. Id.
The Conference proposed instead that the exception for debts for utilities and inventory be
limited to debts incurred within 30 days of payment, when the supplying of the utilities or the
delivery of the inventory and the debtor's payment relating to the utilities or inventory were in the
ordinary course of business of the debtor and the creditor. Id The Commission's exceptions from
the definition of antecedent debt were also criticized for protecting only the debtor's employees and
providers of utilities and inventory, leaving "landlords, unsecured equipment suppliers, and lenders
to inquire why only they are now to be subject to the law abeut preferential transfers." Hearingson
S. 235 andS. 236, supra note 80, pt. II, at 1041 (statement of Professor Vern Countryman). Other
witnesses also complained that unsecured lenders were unfairly prejudiced by the special exceptions
to the definition of antecedent debt in the Commission proposal. See Hearingson H.R. 31 and H.R.
32, supra note 84, pt. 4, at 2491 (statement of John Ingraham on behalf of Robert Morris Assocs.).
The preference provision in H.R. 6 departed from the approach taken in the Commission's
proposal. Instead of defining antecedent debt and creating exceptions to that definition, section
547(c) of H.R. 6 contained six explicit exceptions to avoidance as a preference, including section
547(c)(2) for payment on a debt made within 45 days of the debt's incurrence, if the incurrence of
the debt and payment of it were in the ordinary course of business of both the debtor and the
creditor, and the payment was made according to ordinary business terms. The transcript of the
mark-up minutes of H.R. 6 from the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Committee on the Judiciary also indicates that during the initial drafting of section 547(c)(2), the
committee staff was concerned with the protection of ordinary business transactions. "We agrced
that the ordinary course of business should be protected. If what you had was something that occurred in the ordinary course and was not truly antecedent, we really shouldn't be upsetting those
transfers and causing creditors a lot of trouble." Mark-up Minutes ofH.. 6 supra note 78, at 552
(statement of Mr. Klee). Although the committee staff referred to the protection of "ordinary"
transactions, their concept of "ordinary" was obviously limited to short-term transactions because
the staff suggested that the payments protected by the ordinary course exception were "not truly
antecedent." The "ordinary course of business" language may have been borrowed from the Commission's and the Conference's proposed exceptions from the definition of antecedent debt for payments on debts incurred for utilities or inventory if made within a short time after incurrence and
within the ordinary course of business. The Commission proposal excluded from the definition of
antecedent debt "a debt for inventory paid for within three months of the delivery of the goods in the
ordinary course of the debtor's busfnem" COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 75, pt. 2, at 168 (proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, § 4-607(g)(l)(C)) (emphasis added).
The National Bankruptcy Conference proposal excluded from the definition of antecedent debt
"a debt for public utilities... paid for not more than 30 days after it was due where the utilities were
supplied and the payment was made in the ordinary course of business of the debtor and the creditor" and "a debt for inventory paid for... not more than 30 days after delivery where the inventory
was supplied and the payment was made in the ordinary course of business of the debtor and the
creditor." Hearingson HR. 31 and H.R. 32, supra note 84, app. at 363 (emphasis omitted).
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on the last of the month and mailed and the check was mailed back
and we figured that was forty-five days and we talked to lawyers about
it and businessmen about it and they said that's right. Forty-five days
is a fair period. 98

From these comments, and the drafts of prior legislative effobrts, it
seems that section 547(c)(2) obviously was intended to apply to "transactions that take place within a fairly short period," 99 such as those incident to inventory purchases and utility payments. The forty-five day
period was chosen as a reasonable period "because it's a little bit of an
extension on the ordinary thirty-day term." 1°°
C. The 1984 Amendments.
Beginning in 1979, Congress considered numerous bills proposing
changes to the Code. 10 ' This process resulted in the 1984 amendments.
98. Mark-Up Minutes of H.R&6, supra note 78, at 553 (statement of Mr. Klee).
99. Id. at 562-63. Professor Countryman also embraces this view:
Clearly, Congress intended to limit the exception to the payment of current expenses. If
there was an intent to limit the exception also to "trade debt," the draftsmen must have
despaired of attempting to define that frequently used but intensely undefined term, and
invoked the forty-five day limitation in recognition that most of the trade debt at which
they were aiming was short term.
Countryman, supra note 2, at 769 (footnote omitted). Professor Anderson argues that the legislative
history indicates that there are three purposes of section 547(c)(2):
Short-term loans may well deserve protection in the same sense that short term [sic] trade
credit is protected, since arguably banks making such loans make less inquiry into the
debtor's solvency at the time the loan is made and repaid. Further, such short-term loans
do represent a true addition to the debtor's estate such that repayment shortly thereafter
does not "diminish the estate" on account of an "antecedent debt," as those terms apply to
section 547(c)(2). Finally, such loans might indeed be more readily made to "marginal"
debtors if prompt repayment was protected under section 547(c)(2), and thus would help to
keep a struggling debtor out of bankruptcy.
Anderson, supra note 68, at 1093-94. See also Levin, An Introduction to the Trustee's Avoiding
Powers,53 AM. BANxR. .L 173, 186 (1979) (section 547(c)(2) was intended to exempt normal trade
credit transactions from preferential avoidance); Ward & Shulman, supra note 69, at 83 n.268 (section 547(c)(2) was designed to protect "transfers to such 'like-cash' creditors as utilities and trade
merchants who bill on a monthly basis").
Several courts have also recognized a distinction between short-term debt and long-term debt.
Eg., Marathon Oil Co. v. Flatau (Inre Craig Oil Co.), 785 F.2d 1563, 1567 (11th Cir. 1986) (exception is aimed primarily at ordinary trade credit transactions, short-term obligations which are similar to payment of current expenses); Aguillard v. Bank of Lafayette (rn re Bourgeois), 58 Bankr. 657,
659 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986) ("[Playments made by a debtor to employees, suppliers, for utilities and
rent, and other similar operating expenses or trade credit transactions, were intended by Congress to
be exempt from recovery as preferences.").
10. Mark-Up Minutes of H.R. 6, supra note 78, at 564 (statement of Mr. Levin). See also
Levin, supra note 99, at 186 C"Forty-five days was selected as a normal trade credit cycle.").
101. See H.R. 5148,98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 180, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 445,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 1169, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 1147, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); H.R. 1085, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 2000, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 2000,
97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); H.R. 3705, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 3259, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S. 3023, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 5447, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 658, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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Several specific problems involving trade debt, commercial paper, and
consumer debt had been encountered in the application of the Code and
led to two significant changes to the section 547(c) exceptions from
avoidance. First, Congress removed section 547(c)(2)'s requirement that
the payment to the creditor be made within forty-five days of the date the
debt was incurred.102 Second, Congress added a new exception, section
547(c)(7), for small dollar amount transfers made by consumer debtors.
This exception provides that the trustee may not avoid a transfer "if, in a
case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer
debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by
such transfer is less than $600."103
Virtually all the complaints made to Congress regarding the elimination of the forty-five day period were by trade creditors, commercial
paper issuers, and consumer lenders. 1°4 Trade creditors complained that
many normal trade credit payments by a business debtor were avoidable,
in the absence of the reasonable cause to believe requirement, and were in
many instances not saved from preferential avoidance by the forty-five
day rule in section 547(c)(2). Significantly, Congress did not hear from
long-term business creditors; they did not complain about the operation
of the 1978 Code because most long-term business loans are secured-' 0 5
In addition, even in the event a long-term creditor required additional
security, section 547(c)(2) would not apply because it is limited to "transfers in payment of a debt."
Many of the proposals were designed to correct technical problems and unintended conse-

quences of some of the changes made by the 1978 Code. See, ag., S. REP. No. 305, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2(1979). Congress also conducted oversight hearings on the operation of the 1978 Code. See
BankruptcyReform:HearingsBeforethe Subcomm. on Courtsofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,

98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Bankruptcy Reform Hearings];Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Hearingson BankruptcyReform Act]; PreferenceSection of
the Bankruptcy Code, S. 3023: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on JudicialMachinery of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter Hearingson S. 30231].
102. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,

§ 462(c), 98 Stat. 333, 378.
103. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (Supp. IH 1985).
104. The hearing testimony before Congress, see supra note 101, related to problems experienced
by these groups.
Some commentators seemed disturbed by the avoidabiity of regular installment payments, see

Infra note 124, but only one seemed to argue that all long-term debt (whether or not consumer
installment debt) should be protected under section 547(c)(2). See Nhntmer, Security Interests in
Bankruptcy: An Overview ofSection 547 of the Code, 17 Hous. L. REv. 289, 302 (1980) (purpose of
exception is to protect "normal" transactions; this policy basis could support exemption of payments

on long-term extensions of credit).
105. See J. McNEIL & F. O'LTARY, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL LENDING 96 (1983); J.
PRINGLE & R. HARRIS, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL FiNAICE 462 (1984); J. WFs'roN & E. BRIGHAM, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE 272 (7th ed. 1985).
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Congress eliminated the forty-five day requirement because, contrary to previous assumptions,1 0 6 the forty-five day period between the
date of payment and the date of the incurrence of a debt did not comply

with the trade credit practices in most industries. First, more than fifty
percent of all industry groups had normal payment periods of forty-five
days or longer.10 7 Trade credit periods exceeding forty-five days were

common in many seasonal industries including the clothing, toy, and
sporting goods industries.108
The result was that, in some cases, normal trade credit periods were
distorted to fit within the protection of section 547(c)(2).109 It was

thought that this distortion of business practices would have one of two
effects. Either trade creditors would be unwilling to extend credit for a
period longer than forty-five days, causing severe cash flow problems to
the buyers and retailers with whom they dealt, 110 or, if credit was extended for longer than forty-five days, the trade creditor would demand
terms that would compensate it for the increased risk that any payment it
received might be avoided and recovered if the debtor subsequently en-

tered a bankruptcy proceeding.1 '
Section 547(c)(2)'s forty-five day requirement was troublesome even
in industries with normal trade credit terms of less than forty-five days

because debtors encountered considerable difficulty in determining when
106. The drafters assumed that the 45-day period between the date of payment and the date of
the incurrence of a debt was compatible with the trade credit practices in most industries. See supra
note 98 and accompanying text.
107. See 1981 Hearingson Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 101, at 259 (statement of Vyto
Gestautas on behalf of the National Ass'n of Credit Management) (citing the National Summary of
Domestic Trade Receivables compiled by the Credit Research Foundation, Inc.).
108. Id at 254 (statement of Irving Sulmeyer, attorney). For instance, sporting goods manufacturers shipped spring and summer sporting goods to retailers in the winter and extended trade credit
without interest until the fall, when most retailers would have sufficient cash flow to repay the manufacturers. Id Trade creditors in industries with long trade credit periods wondered why they should
be treated differently than trade creditors in industries where billing periods of 45 days or shorter
were common. Id at 260 (statement of Vyto Gestautas on behalf of the National Ass'n of Credit
Management). See also S.REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1983) (the 45-day limitation
"places undue burdens upon creditors who receive payment under business contracts providing for
billing cycles greater than 45 days").
109. Often this change in business practices caused "considerable economic sacrifice to the
debtor." 1981 Hearingson Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 101, at 248 (statement of Leonard
Rosen, attorney). Most would agree that "a bankruptcy law should not be used to require changes
in perfectly proper business practices or to raise questions as to their validity." Fortgang & King,
supra note 92, at 1168.
110. See 1981 Hearingson Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 101, at 255 (statement of Irving
Sulmeyer, attorney) ('Mhe greatest suffering and hardship will be imposed upon the small and
middle sized retailer who may not be able to pay for merchandise until after the season and after the
merchandise has been sold!).
111. See id at 198 (statement of Vyto Gestautas on behalf of the National Ass'n of Credit
Management).
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the debt was deemed to be incurred 1n 2 and when the payment was
deemed to be made. 113 Court decisions demonstrated that the technical
payments made to many
application of the forty-five day requirement left
14
avoidance.
from
unprotected
trade creditors
Short-term creditors, other than those extending trade credit, also
encountered difficulfies with the operation of section 547(c)(2). Commercial paper issuers objected to the effect section 547(c)(2) had on the
112. The Bankruptcy Code does not define when a debt is deemed incurred. The determination
of the date on which the debt is incurred has proved difficult for many courts. See, eg., Nolden v.
Van Dyke Seed Co. (In re Gold Coast Seed Co.), 751 F.2d 1118, 1119 (9th Cir. 1985) (debt incurred
upon shipment, not when debtor executed agreement to purchase); Nordberg v. Wilcafe, Inc. (In re
Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 51 Bankr. 736, 738 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) (debt incurred on open account
when goods shipped); Harris v. Glo-International Corp. (In re Handsco Distrib., Inc.), 51 Bankr.
700, 702 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) (debt incurred when goods received, rather than when debtor was
first obligated to pay pursuant to invoice); Eckles v. Pan Am. Mktg. (In re Balducci Oil Co.), 33
Bankr. 843, 846 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1933) (debt incurred on date of contract); Richter & Phillips
Jewelers & Distribs., Inc. v. Dolly Toy Co. (In re Richter & Phillips Jewelers & Distribs., Inc.), 31
Bankr. 512, 515 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 19113) (debt incurred "when the goods are delivered, shipped or
identified to the contract, not at the time payment is due or the invoice is sent"); Lansdowne v.
Harbor Sec. Bank (In re Bagwell), 29 Bankr. 461, 466 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) (debt incurred when
debtor received goods); Thomas W. Garland, Inc. v. Union Elec. Co. (In re Thomas W. Garland,
Inc.), 19 Bankr. 920, 928 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1982) (debt for utility usage incurred on date utility
meter was read).
One commentator notes that:
A variety of rules have been proposed to pinpoint the elusive date, but as yet no firm
guideline has emerged. A shibboleth, that a debt is incurred when 'the obligation to pay
becomes legally binding,' has won widespread acceptance. The phrase is unobjectionable,
but adds nothing to the analysis.
Herbert, The Trustee Versus the Trade Creditor: A Critique ofSection 547(c)(1), (2) & (4) of the
.Bankruptcy Code 17 U. RICH. L. R.V. 667, 681 (1983).
113. See Herbert, supra note 112, at 689. If the transfer is made by check, the transfer could be
considered incurred on "the date the check was delivered to the seller, the date the seller initiated the
process of bank collection, (or] the date of final payment." Id
114. See, eg., Grogan v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. (In re Advance Glove Mfg. Co.), 761 F.2d
249, 252 (6th Cir. 1985) (payments for insurance premiums avoided because not made within 45
days of due date); Foreman Indus., Inc. v. Broadway Sand & Gravel (In re Foreman Indus., Inc.),
59 Bankr. 145, 154 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (payment for gravel made during normal credit term of
30 to 60 days avoided because not made within 45 days after debt was incurred); Demetralis v.
Golden Guernsey, Inc. (In re Demetralis), 57 Bankr. 278,284 (Bankr. N.D. M. 1986) (payments to
creditor for dairy products purchased on open account avoided because not made within 45 days
after debt was incurred); Vineyard v. Abel (In re Quality Holstein Leasing, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 70, 7273 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (payment for goods avoided because although check for payment delivered within the 45-day period, payment was not deemed transferred until check was honored 47
days after debt was incurred); McLemore v. Ash McNeil Welding Co. (In re Holder & N. Lumber
Co.), 37 Bankr. 265,266.67 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) (payments for services deemed incurred when
services were rendered rather than when creditor submitted bill to debtor and were thus ontside the
45-day period); In re Villars, 35 Bankr. 868, 873-74 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (payment avoided
because the 45-day period began to run when debtor became legally obligated on the debt, contrary
to customary practicc); Artesani v. Travco Plastics Co. (In re Super Mkt. Distribs. Corp.), 25 Bankr.
63, 65-66 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (payment avoided even though it was alleged that normally creditor accepted payments within 90 to 120 days of invoice).
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market for commercial paper,115 a short-term, unsecured debt obligation
typically issued by large corporations.11 6 Absent the "reasonable cause
to believe" requirement, if a commercial paper issuer entered a bankruptcy proceeding within ninety days after repaying a purchaser, the payment would be a preferential transfer and the purchaser might be
required to remit the payment as an avoidable preference." 7 The ouly
115. See Hearingson S. 3023, supra note 101, at 8-17 (statements ofGeorge Van Cleave, partner,
Goldman, Sachs & Co., and James Ledinsky, Senior Vice President, A.G. Becker, Inc.).
116. A purchaser, often an institutional investor, buys the issuer's commercial paper for cash in
return for the issuer's promise to repay the cash, plus interest, at a fixed time in the future. Commercial paper is necessarily a short-term debt; maturities of commercial paper issues are limited to less
than 270 days to avoid registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Securities
Act of 1933 exempts from its registration requirements notes with a maturity at the time of issue of
not more than nine months. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1982). Commercial paper is an attractive financing vehicle for many corporations because it is usually issued at an interest rate lower than the rate
that would be charged if the corporation borrowed the money from a bank. Hearingson S.3023,
supra note 101, at 15-16 (statement of James Ledinsky, Senior Vice President, A.G. Becker, Inc.)
(companies with top-quality commercial paper ratings borrow, on average, at 1.5% or more below
the cost of alternate sources of short-term funds); td at 29-30 (statement of Nel Baron, counsel to
Standard & Poor's Corp.) ("The ability to borrow in the commercial paper markets at a cost which
is significantly lower than those associated with open bank lines of credit has resulted in extraordinary growth in those markets."); J. PRINGLE & R. HARIs,supra note 105, at 668 (the interest rate
on commercial paper runs one to one and one-half percent less than the prime lending rate at commercial banks); J. WESTON & B. BRIGHAM, supra note 105, at 272 (same).
To qualify for such favorable interest rate treatment, however, purchasers of commercial paper
must be assured that the debt will be repaid. Thus, only corporations with the highest credit ratings
have ready access to the commercial paper market. See Hearingson S.3023, supra note 101, at 13
(statement of George Van Cleave, partner, Goldman, Sachs & Co.) ("Prime ratings from at least two
recognized rating agencies are generally necessary before an issuer can hope to enter this market
.. "). Corporations without such high credit ratings may seek to improve the attractiveness of
their commercial paper by backing their promise to repay the purchaser with an irrevocable letter of
credit issued by a bank for the benefit of the purchasers of the commercial paper. The bank "in effect
lends its credit to the issuer by promising the investor that the bank or insurance company will pay
the investor the amount of the commercial paper note if the issuer does not pay." Id In essence, the
bank issuing the letter of credit promises the commercial paper purchaser that if the issuer does not
repay the purchaser when the debt is due, the bank will. As a result of the bank's promise, the
corporation is able to "piggy-back" on the bank's credit rating and thus gain access to the commercial paper market. Id at 14 (companies can raise funds at a lower net cost by offering buyers not
only their own credit but also the credit of a well-known bank or insurance company).
The credit rating of an issuer's commercial paper might also improve if it was supported by an
irrevocable commitment by a bank to lend the issuer money to pay the commercial paper purchasers
at maturity, or by an indemnity bond issued by an insurance company for the benefit of the purchasers of the commercial paper. IdL at 7 (statement of Professor Lawrence King, New York University
School of Law). The letter of credit, loan commitment, or indemnity bond "may be drawn against
by the holders of the issuer's commercial paper notes upon the failure of the issuer to pay its commercial paper notes at maturity." IdL
117. Hearings on S.3023, supra note 101, at 14 (statement of George Van Cleave, partner,
Goldman, Sachs & Co.). The purchaser would not have any recourse against a bank issuing a letter
of credit to support the issuer's promise because the bank's liability usually lapses upon payment to
the purchaser. eL at 7 (statement of Professor Lawrence King, New York University School of
Law).
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way a purchaser could be ass;ured that the payment would not be avoided
was to purchase commercial paper with a maturity of less than forty-five
days. The result under the 1978 Code was an artificial shortening of the
maturities of commercial paper from as much as 270 days to less than
forty-five days' Is and a decrease in access to the commercial paper market for companies that did not want to issue commercial paper for such a
short term.1 19
A further problem noted during this period was the avoidance of
preferential payments made by consumer debtors. Section 547(c)(2) excepted a payment by a consumer debtor from avoidance only if the payment was made and the debt was incurred in the "ordinary course of...
financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee," and the payment was
made according to ordinary business terms, and within forty-five days of
Responding to the 1978 Code's change inthe preference provision, rating agencies were forced
to base their ratings of commercial paper on the creditworthiness of the commercial paper issuer,
rather than merely on the creditworthiness of the bank issuing the letter of credit. Me Thus, many
companies withont sufficiently high credit ratings found that they could no longer participate in the
commercial paper market. See 1981 Hearingson Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 101, at 233
(statement of Neil Baron, counsel to Standard & Poor's Corp.); see also Hearingson S. 3023, supra
note 101, at 16 (statement of James Ledinsky, Senior Vice President, A.G. Becker, Inc.); id. at 22
(statement of Fred Hervey, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Circle K Corp.); id at 25 (statement of Walter Boris, Executive Vice Pxesident, Consumers Power Co.). Rating agencies based their
rating on the bank's creditworthiness ouly if the issuer's counsel furnished a legal opinion that any
payments made by the company to the purchaser could not be recovered by a bankruptcy trustee in
a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. See 1981 Hearingson Bankruptcy Reform Act,supra note 101,
at 232 (statement of Neil Baron, counsel to Standard & Poor's Corp.); Hearingson S. 3023, supra
note 101, at 30 (same). Counsel gave this opinion only if the commercial paper had a maturity of
less than 45 days and the ordinary course of business requirements were also met.
("[R]eputable
counsel have differed with respect to the applicability of [the 45-day] exception. One reason is that
different uses of commercial paper proceeds could result in different conclusions regarding the 'ordinary conrse' issue.").

118. See Hearingson S. 3023, supra note 101, at 14 (statement of George Van Cleave, partner,
Goldman, Sachs & Co.) (the maturity of all commercial paper sold by Goldman Sachs and backed
by a letter of credit has been limited to 45 days since the effective date of the 1978 Act); see also
Fortgang & King, supra note 92, at 1170 ("[Section 547(c)(2)] functious to require a period of maturity that in many instances may be unrealistic.").
119. Goldman Sachs was concerned that unless the preference provision was amended, many
investors would conclude that "however much they should be able to rely on the 45-day exception or
other 'solutions' to the problem, it is easier to invest funds elsewhere." Hearingson S.3023, supra
note 101, at 15 (statement of George 'Van Cleave, partner, Goldman, Sachs & Co.). See id at 8
(statement of Professor Lawrence King, New York University School of Law) ("I submit that it was
not a purpose of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code to cause valid and established business practices of the
commercial paper market to undergo unnecessary change causing additional expense and perhaps
loss of access to the commercial paper market merely to comply with a tangentially related bankruptcy law."); see also Fortgang & King, supra note 92, at 1170 (operation of section 547(c)(2) may
make badly needed capital unavailable to many corporations). Additionally, the legal "opinions and
structural acrobatics" resulted in "substantially higher costs to issuers, dealers, investment bankers
and persons providing third party supports." 1981 Hearingson BankruptcyReform Act, supra note
101, at 233 (statement of Neil Baron, counsel to Standard & Poor's Corp.).
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the date the debt was incurred. 20 Creditors complained that regular
payments received from consumer debtors on long-term installment obligations were avoidable even though the creditors may not have had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. Some creditors
receiving payments from consumer debtors on long-term installment obligations attempted to assert entitlement to section 547(c)(2)'s protection
by arguing that the date the debt was "incurred," i.e., the date the fortyfive day period began to run, was the date the loan payment was due.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected this
argument in Barash v. Public Finance Corp.121 and held that regular installment payments by consumer debtors to undersecured creditors were
avoidable as preferences because the debt for the principal amount of the
loan was incurred on the date of the loan, rather than on the date each
installment was due. 12 Most other courts 123 and commentators' 24
agreed with this result.
120. II U.S.C. § 547(c)(2) (1982), amendedby Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(c), 98 Stat. 333, 378.
121. 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
122. Id. at 512.
123. See, ag., Wickham v. United Am. Bank (In re Property Leasing & Management, Inc.), 46
Bankr. 903, 913-14 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985); Tidwell v. Merchants & Farmers Bank (In re Dempster), 59 Bankr. 453, 459 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1984); Pippin v. John Deere Co. (In re Pippin), 46
Bankr. 281, 283-84 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1984); Rabin v. Equibank (Inre Faller), 42 Bankr. 593, 594-95
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); Schmitt v. Equibank (In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc.), 34 Bankr. 888, 892
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); Sanborn v. Bangor Fed. Credit Union (In re Sanborn), 29 Bankr. 655, 65758 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983); Grant v. Blazer Fin. Servs. (In re Head), 26 Bankr. 578, 580 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1983); Whitlock v. Max Goodman & Sons Realty, Inc. (In re Goodman Indus., Inc.), 21 Bankr.
512, 521-22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); Grant v. Jacksonville Postal Credit Union (In re Anders), 20
Bankr. 468, 469 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); Ashbier v. General Fin. Co. (In re Bryant), 20 Bankr. 314,
316 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982); Spence v. Lansing Automakers Fed. Credit Union (In re Satterla), I5
Bankr. 166, 168 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981); Paskin v. First Natl Bank (In re Donny), 11 Bankr.
451,452-53 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 198I); Kampfv. Postal Finance (Inre Keeling), 11 Bankr. 361, 36263 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); Belfance v. BancOhlo/National Bank (Inre McCormick), 5 Bankr. 726,
731 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980); Weill v. Southern Credit Union (In re Bowen), 3 Bankr. 617, 619
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980). But see Berstein v. RJL Leasing (Inre White River Corp.), 799 F.2d 631,
633 (10th Cir. 1986); Lang v. Advance Loan Co. (In re Graves), 45 Bankr. 858, 860, 865 (E.D. Cal.
1985).
124. See, &g., D. BAiRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 13, at 317; 4 COLUER ON BANKRUPTCY
1 547.38, at 547-125 (15th ed. 1985); P. MURPHy, CerDrroR's RIGHTS iN BANKRUprcy § 10.15
(Supp. 1985); Anderson, supra note 68, at 1093-94; Ward & Shulnan, supra note 69, at 83 n.268;
Comment, Preferencesand Setoffs. Sections 547 and 553, 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 49, 58 (1985). But cf.
Kaye, supra note 68, at 204-05 (arguing that section 547(c)(2) "requires some rethinking" and suggesting that perhaps different provisions are needed for different types of debt); Nimmer, supra note
104, at 302 (section 547(c)(2) designed to protect "normal" transactions, which could include longterm extensions of credit); Tait & Williams, Bankruptcy Preference Laws= The Scope of Section
547(c)(2), 99 BANKiNG Li. 55, 60-61 (1982) (using an analogy to section 547(a)(4) relating to when
a debt for taxes is incurred and urging that section 547(c)(2) protection be extended to payments to
installment lenders).
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After the rejection of the creditor's argument in Barash that a consumer debt was incurred when the installment payment was due rather
than when the loan funds were advanced, creditors argued that payments
made by business debtors for the interest portion of a long-term debt
were protected by the forty-five day exception because the debt for interest was incurred each day as the interest accrued. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc accepted this

argument in Iowa Premium Service Co. v. First National Bank of St.
Louis (In re Iowa Premium Service Co.), 125 but the decision has not been

1 26
uniformly followed outside the Eighth Circuit.
Consumer creditors also asserted that avoiding payments made by

consumer debtors on long-term installment obligations did not further
equality of distribution of the debtor's estate because the additional sums
recovered by the trustee were usually sufficient only to offset the administrative expenses associated with recovery.1 27 The net result was that the
125. 695 F.2d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 1982) (en bane). Significantly, the parties stipulated that the
bank creditor's demand note was incurred in the ordinary course of the debtor's and creditor's businesses. I at 110. The court's holding may have been conditioned on the fact that the debtor was
entitled to repay the loan without penalty. It could be argued that if the loan contained a prepayment penalty, interest in the amount of the penalty would be deemed incurred on the date the loan
was made. See Lang v. Advance Loan Co. (In re Graves), 45 Bankr. 858, 860 (E.D. Cal. 1985).
Numerous courts followed Iowa Premium and protected interest payments from avoidance if
made within 45 days of the date the interest accrued. See, eg., U; Robbins v. Production Credit
Ass'n (In re Walkington), 62 Bankr. 989, 994 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986); Campbell v. Ford Motor
Credit, Inc. (In re Ernie Causey Ford, Inc.), 57 Bankr. 78, 80 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1985); Rabin v.
Equibank (In re Failer), 42 Bankr. 593, 595 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); Schmitt v. Equibank (rn re
R.A. Beck Builder, Inc.), 34 Bankr. 888, 893 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983).
It was suggested in 1980 that the "Code does not specify whether interest, payable less often
than every forty-five days, is an obligation incurred on the date it is payable or incurred as it accrues
(Le., on a daily basis) with protection only for the forty-five day period preceding payment." American Bar Association Committee on Developments in Business Financing, Structuringand DocumentingusinessFinancingTransactionsUnderthe FederalBankruptcy Code of1978, 35 Bus. LAW.
1645, 1649 (1980).
126. See, eg., Lingley v. Stuart Shaines, Inc. (In re Acme-Dunham Inc.), 50 Bankr. 734,741 (D.
Me. 1985) (obligation to pay interest "arises when the debtor gets a property interest in the consideration exchanged" in loan transaction); Henderson v. Allred (In re Western World Funding, Inc.), 54
Bankr. 470, 480 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985) ("[D]ebt for interest is incurred when the debtor obtains the
funds, even if at that time the obligation is unmatured and contingent."); see also Anderson, supra
note 68, at 1080-88.
127. See S. REP. No. 65, supra note 108, at 14 ("[The administrative expense of these collections, particularly in individual proceedings, results in very little being distributed to creditors."); S.
REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1982) (same); 1983 Bankruptcy Reform Hearings,supra note
101, at 229 (statement of Eldon Hoekstra, Secretary, Credit Union National Ass'n, Inc.) C[C]redit
unions report that the majority of the funds recovered go to the cost of administration rather than
redistribution among creditors."); id. at 124-25 (statement of Robert Evans, Senior Vice President
and General Counsel, National Consumer Finance Ass'n) ("Other creditors are not benefited by this
section since little if any ofthe recovered payments are left to distribute after the administrative costs
and collection costs are paid."); 1981 Hearings on Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 101, at 69
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debtor's estate was not enhanced for the benefit of the creditors. 128
Four types of solutions, in addition to the proposal to eliminate the
forty-five day requirement, 129 were proposed to resolve these perceived
problems with the application of the preference provision. 130 First, in
1981,131 1982,132 and 1983133 bills were introduced to reinsert the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement as an element of a preferential
transfer under section 547(b). Reinsertion of this requirement would
have largely eliminated the alleged problems with the application of the
preference provision because most trade creditors, commercial paper issuers, and consumer lenders would not have reasonable cause to believe
the debtor was insolvent 1 34 This conclusion would be especially true in
those instances where the issuer's promise to repay the commercial paper
purchaser was backed by a letter of credit issued by a bank. It would be
unusual for the purchaser to independently monitor the financial condition of the issuer, because the purchaser could instead rely on the bank's
(statement of Claude Rice, Alvin Wiese, Jr., and Jonathan Landers) ('[A]lthough the provision
theoretically promotes equality, in fact, little actually trickles down to nonpreferred creditors.").
128. It was also argued that the goal of preventing last minute pressure by one creditor to the
prejudice of other creditors was not served because a creditor receiving a timely payment in the
ordinary course of business had no reason to pressure the debtor and had no knowledge of the
debtor's financial difficulties. See 1981 Hearingson Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 101, at 69
(statement of Claude Rice, Alvin Wiese Jr., and Jonathan Landers) ("By definition, ordinary course
payments do not involve creditor pressure of a type which is deterred by the preference section.").
129. S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 211(b) (1983). The explanation for this change was that the
45-day limitation "places undue burdens upon creditors who receive payment under business contracts providing for billing cycles greater than 45 days." S. REP.No. 65, supra note 108, at 60.
130. It was also suggested that section 547(c)(2) be amended to provide that a payment be excepted from avoidance if made shortly after the date the debt was due. Various time periods were
suggested, ranging from five to forty-five days. The National Association of Credit Management
proposed that a payment by a debtor to a creditor be excepted from preferential avoidance if "made
on or before the date when the indebtedness became due or within 45 days thereafter, and made
accordingto terms of credit extended by the transferee at the time the indebtedness was created."
1981 Hearingson Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 101, at 261 (statement of Vyto Gestautus, on
behalf of the National Ass'n of Credit Management); accordid at 249 (statement of Leonard Rosen,
attorney). A fifteen-day period, id,
at 255 (statement of Irving Sulmeyer, attorney), and a five-day
period, Fortgang & King, supra note 92, at 1171, were also proposed.
131. S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10 (1981); H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1981).
132. S. 2000, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 11 (1982).
133. H.R. 1800, 98th Cong., lst Sess. § 111 (1983); S. 445, 98th Cong., lst Sess. § 211(a) (1983);
H.R. 1169, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1983); MR. 1085, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1983).
134. The 1898 Act did not draw a distinction between the avaldability of preferential payments
on short-term debt and the avoidability of preferential payments on long-term debt, although as a
general matter payments on short-term debt were less likely to be found avoidable. In most cases a
timely payment on short-term debt, such as trade credit was not avoidable because a trade creditor
was unlikely to have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. See Dunbam & Price,
supra note 13, at 493. Trade credit is short-term credit extended by a seller in connection with the
sale of goods or the provision of services. See Countryman, supra note 2, at 769. Trade creditors do
not usually monitor the debtor's financial condition to obtain information about the debtor's solvency after the initial decision to deal on credit has been made.
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promise to pay if the issuer did not. The conclusion would also be true as
to consumer lenders who also do not monitor a consumer's financial condition after making the initial decision to lend. Finally, the "reasonable
cause to believe" requirement would also serve to protect from avoidance
payments to creditors on long-term debt, made after the expiration of the
protected forty-five day period, if the trustee was unable to prove that the
creditor had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the
1 35
time of the payment.
A second legislative proposal was directed to the particular
problems of commercial paper purchasers. 3 6 A special exception for
payments made by a commercial paper issuer to the purchaser was proposed.13 7 The National Bankruptcy Conference objected to this "piecemeal" approach to the problems created by the 1978 Code's radical
revision of the preference provision. 38
The third proposal addressed the problems expressed by consumer
installment lenders. It proposed an exception that would insulate a payment from preferential avoidance if the aggregate value of all property
constituting or affected by such transfer was less than $250 in a Chapter
7 or Chapter 13 case or less the $750 in a Chapter 11 case. 3 9 A modified
version of this proposal, the current section 547(c)(7), was contained in
H.R. 5174, the bill that was eventually passed as the 1984
amendments.14o
135. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
136. H.RL 5148, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 3023, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
137. For instance, H.R. 5148, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) would have amended section 547(c) by
adding the following:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer
(7) to or for the benefit of a creditor to the extent such transfer was made to such creditor
in payment of a debt evidenced by a note issued by the debtor prior to the commencement
of the case, and payment of which was supported from the time of its issuance until such
transfer by an irrevocable letter of credit, commitment to lend funds, or bond of indemnity
issued by a credit guarantor in the ordinary course of its business, and without regard to
whether such transfer gives rise to a secured or unsecured claim against the debtor in favor
of the transferor.
138. 1981 Hearingson Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 101, at 250 (statement of National
Bankruptcy Conference).
139. H.1L 1147, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 9 (1983).
140. Congress had considered similar "small transfer" exceptions to preferential avoidance during the discussions leading to the passage of the 1978 Code. The Commission's Bill created an
exception for transfers ofan aggregate value ofless than $1000 to a noninside creditor. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 75, pt. 2, at 166 (proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, § 4-607(b)(1)). The
Commission reasoned that "[r]elatively small preferences do not seriously impinge on the goals of
equality of treatment, avoidance of the grab-bag effect, and prevention of unwise extension of credit.
In addition, the expense of recovery is often disproportionate to the benefit to creditors." Id pt. 1,at
206. Judge Cyr critcized this explanation, arguing that the blanket exemption "is unrelated to the
cost of setting aside any given transfer which may require no more than a mere demand." Cyr,
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The culmination of the discussions regarding possible modification
of section 547, as it was enacted in the 1978 Code, was H.R. 5174.141
H.R. 5174 proposed only one change to section 547(c): the introduction
of section 547(c)(7), relating to payments by consumer debtors.1 42 The
bil was hastily considered in the House because of the urgency of the
jurisdictional crisis facing the bankruptcy court system 43 and was passed
by the House after the jurisdictional provisions of the bill were
amended. 144
The Senate then began consideration of the bill. Senator Thurmond
introduced an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the bill passed
in the House. 145 Senator Thurmond noted that although portions of his
amendment were not included in the House bill, the changes did "have
broad support in the Senate." 146 The amendment contained four distinct
provisions affecting the preference provision of the 1978 Code and addressing problems with its operation that had previously been considered
by the House and Senate. First, Senator Thurmond proposed to amend
Setting the Record Straightfor a ComprehensiveRevision ofthe BankruptcyAct of1898, AM. BANxR.
L.. 99, 166 n.242 (1975). The decision to attack a particular transfer as a preference should be left
to the discretion of the trustee. MkaSimilarly, the report of the National Bankruptcy Conference
suggested that Congress abolish the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement with respect to transfers in excess of a certain dollar amount. "while smaller transfers... [should] be immunized from
attack under § 60." NATIONAL BANKRduz'rcY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 75, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 6164, 6170.
In the Judges' Bill, however, transfers aggregating less than $1000 to noninsiders were not
excepted from avoidance as preferences. SeeHearingsonH.R. 31 andH.R. 32 Before the Subcomm.
on CIil and ConstitutfonalRightsof the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
app. at 177 (1975-76). The Bankruptcy Conference proposal retained the small transaction exception, but limited it to transfers to noninside creditors where the aggregate value of all property so
transferred to that creditor amounted to less than $500. See id. app. at 362 (Bankruptcy Act of
1975, prepared by the National Bankruptcy Conference). The Conference argued that the Commission's proposal would prevent the trustee from recovering preferences of less than $1000 even when
recovery could be had without incurring significant expense. See id.app. at 363. H.R. 6 and the
resulting Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 did not, however, include an exception for small-dollar
amount transactions.
141. H.R. 5174, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
142. Id
143. See supra note 54. The procedural posture of the bill prevented consideration of more than
one amendment 130 CONG. REC.H1796 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1984), although this limitation was
controversial. One congressman stated that substantive bankruptcy revision needed to be considered
indepeudently ofjurisdictional issues: "The package presented to this body today holds bankruptcy
law reform measures hostage to court-restructuring legislation." Id at H1802 (statement of Rep.
Porter). Other representatives argued that the changes in the preference provision were in accord
with "issues that we dealt with in our original H.R. 1800 and which were worked out in the compromise." Id.at H1810 (statement of Rep. Synar); accord id at H1826 (statement ofRep. Matsui).
144. Id at H1854.
145. Id at S6081 (daily ed. May 21, 1984). The text of the amendment (No. 3083) is set forth
fdi at S6107-27.
146. d at S6083.
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section 547(b) to reinsert the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement
as an element of a preferential transfer.147 This proposal was withdrawn
by Senator Thurmond prior to the amendment's passage in the Senate,148
however, apparently in order to gain Senator Metzenbaum's support for
the remainder of Senator Thurmond's proposals.1 49
The second proposed change to section 547 involved amending section 547(c)(2) to remove the forty-five day requirement. 150 This change
had previously been endorsed by the Senate when it passed S.445 in
1983.151 The Senate Report accompanying that bill explained that the
change was necessary because the forty-five day limitation "places undue
burdens upon creditors who receive payment under business contracts
providing for billing cycles greater than 45 days."' 52
A third proposal involved adding section 547(c)(8) to protect payments to commercial paper purchasers from avoidance,1 53 but this proposal was also withdrawn prior to the amendment's passage. 54 One
possible explanation for the withdrawal of proposed section 547(c)(8) is
that elimination of the forty-five day provision from section 547(c)(2) resolved the commercial paper problem and made a special section protecting payments to commercial paper purchasers unnecessary.1 55
147. IM at S6122. This suggestion had been previously considered in Congress. See supra notes
131-33 and accompanying text.
148. IM.at S7617 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
149. IAl (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
150. IAl at S6122 (daily ed. May 21, 1984).
151. IM at S5388 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1983).
152. S. REP. No. 65, supra note 108, at 60.
153. Senator Thurmond's amendment would have amended section 547(c) by adding subparagraph (8), under which the trustee could not avoid a transfer
to or for the benefit of a creditor to the extent such transfer was made to such creditor by a
credit guarantor in payment of a debt evidenced by a note or bond issued by the debtor
prior to the commencement of the case and in accordance with the terms of the debtor's
credit guaranty agreement with the credit guarantor, and payment of which was supported
from time of its issuance until such transfer by an irrevocable letter of credit, irrevocable
commitment to lend funds, irrevocable note purchase agreement or a bond of indemnity
issued by a credit guarantor in the ordinary course of its business.
IAl at S6127 (daily ed. May 21, 1984).
The section was substantially identical to that in S.445, introduced in 1983, which, as passed by
the Senate, protected transfers made to the commercial paper purchaser by the credit guarantor,
rather than transfers made to the purchaser by the issuer ofthe commercial paper. See supra notes
136-37.
154. See Countryman, supra note 2, at 772.
155. A discussion on the Senate floor between Senators Dole and DeConcini regarding the Conference Report on the bill indicates that they believed that the elimination of the 45-day requirement
would "relieve buyers of commercial paper with maturities in excess of 45 days of the concern that
repayments of such paper at maturity might be considered as preferential transfers," and that "companies that have a need for short-term funds, and investors who wish to purchase short-term obligations, would both be acting in their respective 'ordinary course of business or financial affairs" in
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The final section of Senator Thurmond's amendment affecting
section 547(c) was the addition of section 547(c)(7) to protect certain
payments by consumer debtors from preferential avoidance. 156 The proposed addition was identical to that already approved in the House version of H.R. 5174. The Senate passed H.R. 5174,157 as changed by
Senator Thurmond's amendment, adding section 547(c)(7) to the 1978
Code to protect some payments by consumer debtors from avoidance and
eliminating the forty-five day provision from section 547(c)(2).
The Senate insisted on its version of the bill and asked for a conference with the House. 158 The House agreed to the conference and the
conference report was submitted on June 29, 1984.159 The report did not
include a joint explanatory statement of the bill, but only the text of the
bill as agreed to in conference. The conference version of the bill was
identical to the version passed by the Senate as it related to section
547.160 The conference bill was accepted by both the Senate and the
House 6 1 and signed by the President.
Although the legislative history is not conclusive, it is possible to
assert that the changes made by the 1984 amendments to the preference
provision were made merely in response to particular concerns of various
creditor groups. Thus, removal of the forty-five day provision responded
to problems encountered by trade creditors 62 and commercial paper
purchasers1 63 who asserted that the arbitrary forty-five day limitation
was not consistent with regular short-term extensions of credit and resulted in the distortion of normal business practices to fit within the exception. Further, the addition of section 547(c)(7) to protect certain
small dollar amount transfers by consumer debtors responded to the
problems encountered by lenders to consumers following elimination of
the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement. 16
dealing with each other in the commercial paper market. 130 CONG. REc. 88897 (daily ed. June 29,
1984, pt.1). See also Dunham & Price,supra note 13, at 497-99.
156. Senator Thurmond's amendment proposed the addition of section 547(c)(7) to except from
preferential avoidance a transfer "if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily
consumer debts, the aggregate value of al property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is
less than $600." 130 CONG. REc. S6114 (daily ed. May 21, 1984).
157. Mdat S7625 (daily ed. June 19, 1984).
158. MaL
159. H.R. CONF.REP. No. 882, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AnMIN. NEWS 576.
160. 130 CONG. REc. S8887 (daily ed. June 29, 1984, pt. II) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); id.
at H7489 (daily ed. June 29, 1984, pt. I) (statement of Rep. Rodino).
161. MeLat S8900, H7500 (daily ed. June 29, 1984, pt. II).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 106-14.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 120-24.
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Some commentators have suggested that the removal of the fortyfive day provision from the ordinary course of business exception should
be read as-extending the exception's protection to payments on long-term
debt because the "legislative history contains no express statement which
limits 547(c)(2) to short-term debt."'165 The contrary inference, however,
seems more persuasive-that is, the absence of any clear indication that
Congress intended to expand section 547(c)(2) protection to long-term
debt justifies an inference that there was no such intent. Furthermore,
because no creditors complained during the hearings conducted on the
operation of the 1978 Code that the avoidance of payments on long-term
debt by business debtors was unfair, 166 it is unlikely that Congress considered the avoidability of such payments a problem that it should address. Nor is there any indication that Congress intended, by eliminating
the forty-five day requirement, to narrow the objective of the preference
provision from that of preserving equality of distribution to that of
preventing inequality resulting from impermissible creditor pressure applied by a creditor hoping to obtain more favorable treatment than it
would otherwise receive in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. The
most obvious indication that Congress did not wish to return to a concept of avoiding only those payments that might be the result of creditor
pressures was its decision not to return to the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement as an element of a preferential transfer. Long-term
creditors lost the protection of the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement as a result of a deliberate policy choice by Congress in the 1978
Code. It appears unreasonable to suggest that Congress intended to
overturn that choice in the 1984 amendments without significant discussion,' 67 particularly when the discussion that did accompany the amendment of section 547(c)(2) is consistent with interpreting the section to
protect only short-term debt.
I.

RECONCILING THE ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS
EXCEPTION 'MrIH
THE POLICIES OF THE

PREFERENCE PROVISION

Although the legislative history of the ordinary course of business
exception plausibly supports, or at least is not inconsistent with, an interpretation of section 547(c)(2) excluding long-term debt from its coverage,
165. DeShnone, supra note 13, at 129.
166. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
167. See Aguillard v. Bank of Lafayette (In re Bourgeois), 58 Bankr. 657, 659-60 (Bankr. W.D.
La. 1986) ("It also seems unlikely that Congress intended to make a sweeping change in the ordinary
course exception, because of the lack of debate and legislative history accompanying the
amendment.").
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that history is obviously inconclusive. Examination of the policies of the
preference provision and the ordinary course of business exception is
thus critical to a proper determination of the exception's scope.
The principal objective of the preference provision is to "facilitate
the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors
of the debtor." 168 When a debtor becomes insolvent, a transfer to a creditor whose claim is not fully secured necessarily impairs the claims of the
debtor's other unsecured and undersecured creditors. 169 The trustee's
power to avoid preferential transfers only partially prevents the resulting
unequal treatment of creditors because the power in most cases extends
only to transfers made during the ninety day period preceding the filing
of the bankruptcy petition and does not reach transfers previously made
170
by an insolvent debtor.
It has been suggested that section 547(c)(2), as originally enacted,
was justified because it was not inconsistent with the goal of equal distribution. The argument is that payments of short-term debt do not deplete
the debtor's estate because the recent extension of credit provides offsetting value to the estate.171 The court in Bourgeois and at least one commentator have relied on this "depletion of the estate" rationale to argue
that section 547(c)(2), as amended, should not be read to cover payments
on long-term debt.17 2 This argument, although superficially attractive, is
168. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 178, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6138. See also Palmer Clay Prods. Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227,229 (1936); D.
BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 13, at 281; 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11547.03, at 547-20 (15th

ed. 1985); McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences; and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L.
REV. 249, 260 (1981); Seligson, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Act, 15 VAND. L. REv. 115, 115
(1961).
Of course, the equality of distribution principle may be more accurately characterized as a
"policy of preserving classes and of preserving equality within classes," Countryman, supra note 2,
at 748, in recognition of the fact that creditors with perfected security interests are preferred over
unsecured creditors and priority claimants are preferred over nonpriority claimants.
169. See McCoid, supra note 168, at 260.
170. The trustee is empowered only to avoid preferential transfers made 90 or fewer days before
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (Supp. HI 1985), or less than one year
before the filing of the petition if the transfer is to an insider. Id § 547(b)(4)(B).
171. See Lingley v. Stuart Slaines, Inc. (In re Acme-Dunham Inc.), 50 Bankr. 734, 740 (D. Me.

1985); Wickham v. United Am. Bank (In re Property Leasing & Management, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 903,
914 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985); Herbert, supra note 13, at 217; Kaye, supra note 68, at 201-02.
172. See Aguillard v. Bank of Lafayette (In re Bourgeois), 58 Bankr. 657, 660 (Bankr. W.D. La.

1986). Professor Duncan makes the argument as follows:
[U]nlike the case of short-term financing of goods and services, in which value is given to

the financially distressed debtor during his or her slide into bankruptcy, there is no offset-

ting addition to the estate in the period shortly before bankruptcy when a long-term credi-

tor receives installment payments during the preference period. Thus, the long-term
installment payment clearly results in the depletion of the bankruptcy estate for the benefit
of a particular creditor, exactly the situation that preference law generally seeks to discourage.
Duncan, supra note 13, at 90 (footnotes omitted).
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flawed. If the transfer of payment is a preference, the payment, by definition, diminishes the estate that would otherwise be available for all creditors pursuant to section 547(b)(5).173 Furthermore, although goods
purchased with short-term credit shortly before bankruptcy will probably still be hi the estate, it is equally probable that a piece of machinery
purchased on credit five years earlier will also still be in the estate.174
The argument that a payment to a short-term creditor does not diminish the debtor's estate involves an attempt to draw a line between
short-term creditors and long-term creditors. The equality of distribution goal, however, distinguishes between creditors and noncreditors.
Creditors are not treated unequally when a debtor transfers assets in an
exchange with a noncreditor. For example, a merchant who sells goods
for cash 1 : rather than for a claim to a future transfer does not share the
risk that the debtor may have insufficient assets to satisfy future claims.
In contrast, a creditor shoulders the risk of nonpayment equally with
other creditors.
Some of the exceptions hi section 547(c) recognize this difference by
singling out transfers that resemble those made to a noncreditor who
deals with the debtor only in exchange for immediate value. For example, section 547(c)(1) protects a transfer intended to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor and which is in fact a
substantially contemporaneous exchange.17 6 The section covers transfers
made by check and a transfer of a security interest in a substitution of
173. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1982) sets forth as an element of a preferential transfer the requirement that as a result of the transfer the transferee receive more than it would have received in a
Chapter 7 proceeding if the transfer had not been made. Thus, "any transfer to a creditor within the
90-day period by way of payment on or security for an antecedent debt causes a depletion of the
debtor's estate and, other elements being present, will constitute a voidable preference." 4 CoLuER
ON BANKRuPTcy 547.20, at 547-83 (15th ed. 1985). The diminution-in-estate notion comes from
the 1898 Act. Cases decided under the 1898 Act held that "t]o constitute a preferential transfer
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act there must be a parting with the bankrupt's property for

the benefit of the creditor and a consequent diminution of the bankrupt's estate." Continental &
Commercial Trust & Sav. Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 229 U.S. 435, 443 (1913). This requirement has been codified in section 547(b)(5), and perhaps in section 547(c)(1), the contemporaneous exchange exception. See Countryman, supra note 2, at 745, 766-67.
174. See DeSimone, supra note 13, at 130.

175. A transfer cannot be on account of an antecedent debt if it is made for new value. "New
value" is defined to include "money or money's worth in goods." 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (Supp. III
1985). Of course, the exchange must not be so unequal as to amount to a fraudulent conveyance.
IaR § 548 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
176. Section 547(c)(1) provides:

The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer(1) to the extent that such transfer was-

(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was
made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor, and

(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange ....
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1982).
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collateral transaction.177 In both cases, the transfer may be a preference
under the technical requirements of section 547(b), but because it is, in
essence, a contemporaneous exchange for new value, the other creditors'
interests are not impaired and the policy of equality of distribution is not
offended. The ordinary course of business exception, however, grants
protection to a creditor who has agreed to deal with the debtor in return
for a claim against the debtor's estate, rather than for immediate value.
Thus, the exception is inherently inconsistent with the objective of equal
distribution.
A second objective of the preference provision is to assist the debtor
in working its way "out of a difficult financial situation through cooperation with all of his creditors" by discouraging creditors from engaging in
the so-called "race of diligence." 178 The House and Senate Reports accompanying the 1978 Code reiterate that section 547(c)(2) was designed
to "leave undisturbed normal financial relations, because it does not detract from the general policy of the preference section [which is] to discourage unusual action by either the debtor or his creditors during the
debtor's slide into bankruptcy. ' 179
Some commentators have suggested that section 547(c)(2) should be
extended to protect payments on long-term debt because (1) the longterm creditor is not likely to take part in a race to gain advantage over
other creditors, and (2) regular payments on long-term debt constitute
normal financial relations that should not be disturbed.8 0 This assertion, however, is strained for four reasons. First, the legislative history is
misleading. After Congress removed the "reasonable cause to believe"
requirement in 1978, the main goal of the preference provision was to
preserve equality of distribution; the prevention of unusual pressure or
action by the creditor became ouly an incidental objective.18 1 Second,
and more importantly, there is no direct indication that Congress in177. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy 1 547.37[2], at 547-124 to 547-125 (15th ed. 1985); Duncan,
DelayedPerfection ofSecurity Interests in PersonalPropertyand the Substantially Contemporaneous
Exchange Exception to PreferenceAttack 62 NEB. L. REv. 201, 210-11 (1983).
178. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 177-78, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6138. One commentator has argued that the preference provision does not
deter the race of diligence, however, because "a preferred creditor can retain his preference if the
ninety day period elapses before the bankruptcy petition is filed," and because if the petition is filed
within 90 days of the payment, "the preferred creditor can escape all consequences of having been
preferred by simply surrendering his preference." Countryman, supra note 2, at 748.
179. HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6329; S. Rr. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5874.
180. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
181. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &

ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6138.
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tended to change this policy focus in the 1984 amendments.' 8 2 Congress
rejected returning to the goal of preventing unusual action by declining
to reinsert the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement.1 83 The elimination of that requirement was one of the most significant and debated
changes to the preference provision made by the 1978 Code.'" It seems
unlikely that removal of the forty-five day requirement from section
547(c)(2) was intended to change the focus of the preference provision
from equality of distribution to prevention of the race of diligence, especially in the absence of any discussion to that effect.185
Third, commentators argue that section 547(c)(2), as amended, protects payments on long-term debt because these payments are within normal financial relations.1 8 6 These commentators rely on the legislative
history accompanying the 1978 version of section 547(c)(2). 18 7 This reliance on the "normal financial relations" concept is misplaced, however,
because this phrase refers to payments on debt satisfying the ordinary
course of business requirements and made within forty-five days of the
date the debt was incurred. Since the statutory provision was specifically
limited to short-term debt, it cannot be said that Congress intended "normal financial relations" to encompass payments on long-term debt.
Finally, declining to read section 547(c)(2) as extending to payments
on long-term debt does not imply a complete rejection of the deterrence
objective. Although deterring the race to dismember the debtor is not
the major objective of the preference provision, deterrence is recognized
in current sections 547(c)(2)(B) and (C), which require that payments be
made (1) in the ordinary course of business of the debtor and the transferee and (2) according to ordinary business terms.183 A payment compelled by creditor pressure would not be afforded protection from
avoidance.
If the ordinary course of business exception is inconsistent with the
goal of equality, and if the protection of "normal financial relations" does
not define the outer limits of the exception as amended in 1984, the problem of defining the outer limits of the exception remains. The resolution
of this problem relates to the reasons behind preventing the race of diligence. Congress intended to deter the race of diligence in order to enable
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
ADMN.

See supra text accompanying note 165.
See supra text accompanying notes 131-33, 147-48.
See supra text accompanying notes 80-93.
See supra note 167.
See supra note 13.
See H.1L REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 373, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
NEWS 5963, 6329; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE

CONG. & ADMN. NEWS 5787, 5874.

188. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2)(B),

(P

(Supp. I1 1985). See supra text accompanying notes 34-43.
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the debtor "to work his way out of a difficult financial situation through
cooperation with all of his creditors." 189 This statement indicates that
Congress intended to encourage 90 ordinary transactions that may keep
the debtor in business.1 91 This goal suggests a way to distinguish between debt incurred in the ordinary course of the debtor's business and
debt that is not so incurred.
Section 547(c)(2) encourages creditors to extend short-term credit to
finance a troubled debtor's current operations. In most instances, a creditor's decision to lend money to a debtor depends on whether the creditor
believes the debtor will be able to repay the loan when due and whether
the creditor believes the debtor will not enter a bankruptcy proceeding
for ninety days thereafter. A short-term creditor evaluating the risk of
nonpayment might be fairly confident that the debtor will be able to repay the debt when due from the proceeds of the current operations financed by the debt. For instance, a creditor extending credit to finance
the debtor's purchase of raw materials may view the proceeds arising
from later sales of the finished goods as the source of funds to repay the
loan. If the short-term creditor believes that the risk of nonpayment is
minimal, it must still evaluate the likelihood that the debtor will enter
a
bankruptcy proceeding within ninety days after the payment. If the ordinary course of business exception is not available, then a debtor (especially one experiencing temporary financial difficulty) might be unable to
borrow to finance its current operations. In contrast, the extension of
section 547(c)(2) to cover payments on long-term debt does not significantly affect the long-term creditor's initial decision to make a loan. For
example, suppose the creditor contemplates a five-year loan to be repaid
in monthly installments. Interpreting section 547(c)(2) to extend to payments on long-term debt only affords protection for ninety days of payments received at the end of a sixty month payback period. Protecting
these payments from avoidance will not significantly alter the creditor's
risk of the debtor's insolvency, and thus offers little inducement to a
creditor to extend long-term debt.
189. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6138.

190. Professor Herbert argues, however, that the legislative history suggests that section
547(c)(2) was not designed to encourage anything, but was designed merely to avoid penalizing the
unknowing recipient of a preference. Herbert, supra note 112, at 670 & n.14.
191. See Morrow v. United States (in re Morris), 53 Bankr. 190, 192 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985)
("This court believes that the purpose of § 547(c)(2) was to encourage creditors to continue shortterm credit dealings with troubled debtors in order to forestall bankruptcy rather than encourage
it."). "[Cireditors may continue doing business with the debtor because they will not be penalized if

the debtor's attempt to function outside of bankruptcy fails." Countryman, supra note 2, at 775.
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In addition, preserving the trustee's ability to avoid payments to a
long-term creditor may further the goal of preventing the debtor's bankruptcy. 192 Suppose a debtor is unable to meet all of its financial obligations, including a regularly scheduled payment to a long-term creditor,
and asks the long-term creditor for an extension so that it may meet its
obligations to suppliers with whom it must deal to continue its operations. If section 547(c)(2) protects any regular payment received by the
long-term creditor from avoidance, the creditor may insist on its regular
payment knowing that it will not be avoidable if the debtor enters bankruptcy within the following ninety days. If section 547(c)(2) does not
protect regular payments on long-term debt from avoidance, the creditor
has an incentive to work with the debtor so that the debtor may overcome its temporary financial difficulties, stay out of bankruptcy, and
eventually meet all of its obligations in full.
Thus, the goal of encouraging creditors to deal with the debtor suggests a way to distinguish between debt incurred in the ordinary course
of the debtor's business and debt that is not so incurred. 193 This distinction, as suggested above, may depend on whether the debt is short-term
or long-term because the extension of short-term credit is necessary for
the continuing operations of the debtor. Although determining where to
draw the line separating short-term and long-term debt may seem impractical,1 94 similar lines are drawn in other areas.19 5 For instance, accountants draw a similar distinction when classifying liabilities to be
reported on a corporation's balance sheet as either current or long-term.
Under generally accepted accounting principles, the term "longterm liabilities" typically is used to refer to debt used to finance the acquisition of fixed assets. Debtors expect to repay long-term debt from
increased cash flow and profits generated over the next few years from
192. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
193. Professor Countryman suggests that ifthejustification for section 547(c)(2) is to encourage
creditors to enter into ordinary transactions that may keep the debtor from failing, payments on all
debt should be protected because all debt-trade debt, short-term bank notes, and long-term installment obligations-may be equally important in keeping the debtor in business. Countryman, supra
note 2, at 775-76.

194. As one commentator asks:
[Iow do you define short-term? Six months, one year, two years? The line... is at best
fuzzy. It will no doubt take years for the courts to consistently define short-term and when
they do the decision will be little more than arbitrary judicial line drawing.
DeSimone, supra note 13, at 129.
195. The distinction between capital expenditures and currently deductible operating expenses
for income tax purposes poses a similar line-drawing problem. See generally Note, Distinguishing
Between CapitalExpendituresand OrdinaryBusiness Expenses A Proposalfora UniversalStandard,

19 U. MICH. .L. REP. 711 (1986); Note, Income Tax-Costs of Expanding an Existing Business:
Current Deductions Versus CapitalExpenditures-NorthCarolina Bank Corp. v. United States, 18
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1127 (1982).
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the use of the fixed assets, rather than from current operations. 196 The
term "current liabilities" is used to "designate obligations whose liquidation is reasonably expected to require the use of existing resources prop-

erly classifiable as current assets, or the creation of other current
iabffities."'19 The term "current assets" designates those assets that are
expected to be realized in cash, sold, or consumed during the "operating
cycle"-the usual time between the acquisition of materials or services
entering the production process and the final cash realization from the
sale of the finished products or services. 19 8 Current liabilities include
"obligations for items which have entered into the operating cycle, such
as payables incurred in the acquisition of materials and supplies to be
used in the production of goods or in providing services to be offered for
sale... and debts which arise from operations directly related to the
operating cycle.2 199
196. Long-term debt is "normally used to finance fixed assets or permanent additious to working
capital. Repayment usually must come from profits rather than from liquidation of the assets financed, as in the case of seasonal short-term loans." 3. PRINGLE & R. HARis, supra note 105, at
462. Thus, long-term lenders are "more concerned with [the debtor's] income statement, looking for
their security to the [debtor's] earning power over sustained periods of time." Id.at 643.
Nor is it likely that a debtor would be able to use short-term debt to finance long-term needs.
According to generally accepted accounting principles, short-term obligations must be excluded
from classification as current liabilities if the debtor intends to refinance the obligation on a longterm basis and is able to do so. STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 6 (Financial
Accounting Standards Board 1975). Moreover,
[blanks often require borrowers to "clean up" their short-term loans for at least one month
each year, this prevents firms from using bank credit as a source of permanent financing.
As the borrowing firm's inventories and receivables are liquidated during the slack season,
the firm should be able to repay the loan. Then, if the firm's repayment performance has
been satisfactory, the bank will again provide a line of credit to meet the firm's seasonal
financing needs during the next year. If the firm is chronically unable to become free of
bank debt for a part of each year, this suggests a need for more long-term capital.
F. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 105, at 257; accord 3. PRINGLE & R. HARMs, upra note
105, at 660. Contra Viscione, How Long Should You Borrow Short Term?, HARV. Bus. REV.,
March/April 1986, at 20 ("Smaller companies often use short-term loans to finance permanent investments in working capital."). Nor do "current liabilities" include "long-term obligations incurred
to provide increased amounts of working capital for long periods." RE-STAmTMENT AND REVISION
OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BuLLTINs, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, ch. 3, § A8 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1953) [hereinafter ARB No. 43].
197. ARB No. 43, supra note 196, ch. 3, § A7.
198. Id.ch. 3, § AS. Most businesses have more than one operating cycle per year. 3. BURTON,
R. PALMER & R. KAY, HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 3-14 (1981).

199. ARB No. 43, supra note 196, ch. 3, § A7. Although the generally accepted accounting
definition ofcurrent liabilities is helpful in suggesting a distinction between what I have called shortterm and long-term debt, the accounting definition should not be directly applied. "Current liabilities" include the current portion oflong-term debt. Obviously, this definition of current liabilities is
helpful only ifwe consider short-term debt to be comparable to liabilities that are initially classified
as current on the debtor's balance shcet (and not the currently due portions of liabilities which were
initially classified as long-term on the debtor's balance sheet). In addition, accountants classify as
current liabilities all those liabilities expected to be repaid during the longer of one year or the
debtor's operating cycle. Because section 547(c)(2) is an exception to the preference provision and to
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For instance, assume the debtor manufactures baseball bats. Its operating cycle is determined by the length of time it takes to purchase the
wood used to make the bats, manufacture the bats, sell the bats to sporting goods stores, and collect the resulting accounts receivable. A debt
incurred to purchase the wood for the bats would be classified as a current liability if the debt's term was shorter than the debtor's operating
cycle, indicating that the debt was indeed incurred to finance the current
operations of the debtor. In contrast, a financially troubled debtor may
temporarily postpone incurring long-term debt to finance fixed assets. If
the debtor's financial condition does not improve sufficiently so as to
make a creditor willing to extend long-term debt, bankruptcy policy
should not serve to encourage loans to a debtor whose liabilities continually exceed its assets. If the debtor's financial difficulties are permanent,
rather than temporary, its assets should be liquidated in a bankruptcy
proceeding and directed to more profitable uses.
Even if it is possible to distinguish between short-term and longterm debt, some might argue that section 547(c)(2) should be read even
more narrowly to include only trade credit. 2 00 There is seemingly no
justification, however, for distinguishing among the three sources of
short-term debt-trade credit, short-term loans from banks or other financial institutions, and commercial paper-in determining whether a
debt is incurred in the ordinary course of the debtor's business. Different
treatment of short-term debt based on the source of funds might discourage a debtor from obtaining the least expensive financing. For instance,
short-term bank debt often carries a lower interest rate than trade credit
extended by a supplier of goods, and the interest rate on commercial
paper issues is typically one to one and one-half percentage points lower
than the prime rate offered by many banks. 20 ' There is no defensible
the general policy of equality of distribution, it should be construed narrowly. Thus, to the extent
accounting principles inform a distinction between short-term and long-term debt, short-term debt
should include only those liabilities that are used to finance current operations during the debtor's
operating cycle, and should not extend to include liabilities that will be repaid within one year if the
debtor's operating cycle is less than one year.
200. See Aguillard v. Bank of Lafayette (In re Bourgeois), 58 Bankr. 657, 660 (Bankr. W.D. La.

1986) (suggesting that section 547(c)(2) "was intended to apply to trade credit transactions" rather
than long-term debt).
201. Assume a buyer purchases goods on account and the seller is willing to give a two percent
price discount if payment is received within 10 days after the sale or will alternatively accept the full
purchase price if payment is received within 30 days after the sale. This is a normal trade credit term
called -2/10, net 30." If the buyer forgoes the discount and pays the full purchase price on the
thirtieth day after purchase, the cost of not taking the discount is 37% on an annualized basis. L
PRINGLE & P. HARRIS, supra note 105, at 656-58; J.WrsrON & -.BRIGHAM, supra note 105, at

261-63. Bank debt, of course, often carries additional costs beyond the stated interest rate that must
be considered in computing the debtor's actual costs of funds. For instance, the "borrower should
expect to bear certain costs which will include the fees of its own counsel, and printing and other
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reason to allow a payment to a trade creditor to stand, but to avoid a
payment to a bank creditor if the debtor chose to finance its inventory
purchases with a less expensive short-term bank loan rather than with
more expensive trade credit offered by a supplier.
The legislative history of the ordinary course of business exception
indicates that Congress intended the exception to comprehend payments
to trade creditors. 20 2 There are also indications that Congress assumed
that commercial paper could be issued in the ordinary course of a
debtor's business. Congress conducted hearings on problems experienced by commercial paper issuers under the 1978 Code.203 The focus
of the discussion was not whether commercial paper could be issued in
the ordinary course of a debtor's business, but whether the maturities of
commercial paper issues had been artificially limited by section 547(c)(2)
to less than forty-five days.2 04 Moreover, when the forty-five day provision was removed in 1984, Senators Dole and DeConcini asserted that
"companies that have a need for short-term funds, and investors who
wish to purchase short-term obligations, would both be acting in their
respective 'ordinary course of business or financial affairs' if they were to
deal directly or indirectly with each other in the commercial paper market." 20 5 Presumably, short-term debt from other sources, such as banks
or other financial institutions, may also be incurred in the ordinary
course of the debtor's business.
A final question is how to distinguish between a debt that may be
incurred in the ordinary course of financial affairs of a consumer debtor
and a debt that may not be so incurred. The line between short-term and
long-term debt may be harder to draw in the case of a consumer debtor
than in the case of a business debtor. Current liabilities of an individual
include all liabilities with a maturity of less than one year. This period is
arbitrarily chosen for administrative convenience. Although it is difficult
to conceptualize an operating cycle of a consumer debtor, it is possible to
suggest that since a wage earning consumer realizes the earnings from his
out-of-pocket expenses of the lender related to the transaction." COMMITrTE ON DEVELOPMENTS
iN BusiNEss FINANCiNG, supra note 71, at 50.
Similarly, the issuance of commercial paper may be a less expensive source of funds than shortterm bank credit for those companies that have access to the market. Interest rates on commercial
paper generally run about 1.5% below the prime rate. T.PIuNGLE & 1L HARRIS, supra note 105, at
667-68; . WESTON & E.BRIGHAm, supra note 105, at 272. See supra note 116.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
204. Seesupra note 118 and accompanying text.
205. 130 CoNG. RE . S8897 (daily ed. Yune 29, 1984, pt. I) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)
(emphasis added). See supra note 155.
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employment in monthly or biweekly pay intervals, that period approximates the consumer's "operating cycle."
Perhaps in recognition of the trouble that might be encountered in
determining the kinds of debts incurred in the "ordinary course" of a
consumer debtor's "financial affairs," Congress enacted section 547(c)(7)
as part of the 1984 amendments. The exception protects from preferential avoidance each transfer by a consumer debtor if "the aggregate value
of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than
$600. ' $206 The addition of section 547(c)(7) effectively eliminates, in the
case of most consumer payments, the necessity of determining whether
the debt was incurred and payment made in the ordinary course of the
financial affairs of the consumer.
The addition of section 547(c)(7) may also represent Congress's attempt to respond to many of the concerns voiced by creditors of consumer debtors without interfering with the established policies of the
preference provision for debts other than consumer debts. For instance,
creditors complained that avoidance of small payments made by consumers on installment debts did not, in practice, further the equality of distribution goal since the amounts recovered were usually not great enough
to offset the administrative expenses associated with the recovery effort.
The addition of this special exception suggests Congress did not mean to
expand the scope of the ordinary course of business exception contrary to
the bankruptcy goal of equality.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The ordinary course of business exception, as amended in 1984,
should not be read so broadly as to protect payments on long-term debt
from preferential avoidance. Although many have concluded that this is
the inevitable result of the removal of the requirement that the payment
be made within forty-five days of the incurrence of the debt, that conclusion is not justified. Such an expansive interpretation would seriously
impair the effectiveness of preference law and the goal of equality of distribution of an insolvent debtor's assets to its creditors. The legislative
history of the ordinary course of business exception and the policies underlying it suggest an appropriate limiting principle: the exception only
protects payments on debts incurred in the ordinary course of the
debtor's business, and only short-term debt incurred to finance the
debtor's current operations-that is, debt to be repaid in the normal operating cycle of the debtor-may be deemed incurred in the ordinary
course.
206. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(7) (Supp. M 1985).

